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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court hasjurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(j) (1996). 
This appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the actions of the Board of Trustees with respect to the amendment 
of the CC&R's substantially comply with Utah Statutes and the Homeowners Associations' 
organizational documents? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs'Motion 
to Reconsider on the grounds that the Motion presented no 'newly discovered evidence'? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) The standard of review on an Appeal from the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment is that the Appellate Court accords no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions of law which are reviewed for correctness. See Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am.. 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court may affirm a grant of Summary 
Judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied upon below. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
(2)A trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment is reviewed 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion. See Lund 
v.HalL 938 P.2d 285,287 (Utah 1997); In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 12 (Utah 1999). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
LLC.A. Section 16-6-29. Voting - Quorum 
The articles of incorporation or bylaws may provide the number or 
percentage of members entitled to vote represented in person or by 
proxy or the number or percentage of votes represented in person or 
by proxy, which shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of members. 
In the absence of any such provision, the members present in person 
or represented by proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of 
members. The vote of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by 
the members present or represented by proxy at a meeting at which a 
quorum was initially present shall be necessary for the adoption of 
any matter voted on by the members unless a greater proportion is 
required by this act, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. 
U.C.A. Section 16-6-30. Voting - Rights of members 
The right of the members, or any class or classes of members, to vote 
may be limited, enlarged or denied to the extent specified in the 
articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Unless so limited, enlarged 
or denied, each member, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one 
vote on each matter submitted to a vote of members. 
A member may vote in person or, unless the articles of incorporation 
or the bylaws otherwise provide, may vote by proxy executed in 
writing by the member or by his duly authorized attorney in fact. 
Where trustees or officers are to be elected by members, the 
governing board by resolution or the bylaws may provide that such 
elections may be conducted by mail. 
U.C.A. Section 16-6-33. Consent to action without meeting 
Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the 
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action which 
may be taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may be taken 
without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so 
taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled to vote with 
respect to the subject matter thereof, or all of the trustees, as the case 
maybe. 
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Such consent shall have the same force and effect as a unanimous 
vote, and may be stated as such in any articles or document filed with 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code under this act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Jean and Rebecca Levanger, as a derivative action, 
against Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc., alleging that the manner in 
which the Associations amended CC&R's were approved was improper and contrary to the 
Association's organizational documents and Utah law. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint January 21, 1997. (R. 9.) Defendant Highland 
Estates filed its Answer February 26, 1997. (R. 77.) 
Highland Estates filed a Motion for Summary Judgment November 26,1997. (R. 
198.) A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the Third District 
Court, the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring presiding, on January 9, 1998, two weeks before 
the scheduled trial on this matter. (R. 411.) The Court issued an order granting in part 
Highland Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment on May 28, 1998. (R. 467.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Decision Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment or to Certify the Order as Final and Appealable on July 16, 1998. (R. 479.) A 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider was heard by the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on October 7, 1998. At the hearing, the Court denied 
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Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and granted Plaintiffs Motion to Certify the Summary 
Judgment as Final pursuant to Rule 54(b) and (after hearing argument on Plaintiffs 
Objections to Form of the Order) signed an Order to effect the Court's ruling on March 3, 
1999. (R. 1063.) 
The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1999. (R. 1074.) The case 
subsequently was poured over to the Court of Appeals by Order dated May 18, 1999, and 
filed May 20, 1999. (The Order has no Bates stamp in the record on appeal but the index 
to the record indicates that it should be page 1145 of the record on appeal.) *** 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about March 14,1972, Restrictive Covenants ("1972 CC&R's") 
of Highland Estates Properties Owners Associations, Inc. ("Highland Estates") were 
recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office amending earlier conditions and 
restrictions. (R. 242-245, 202.) The 1972 CC&R's provide that the CC&R's can be 
amended by a vote of a majority of owners of lots in the subdivision. (R. 245.) The 1972 
CC&R's are silent as to how and where such a vote is to be taken. (R. 245.) 
2. On or about October 30, 1972, the Articles of Incorporation of 
Highland Estates were filed with the State of Utah, incorporating Highland Estates as a non-
profit corporation. (R. 247-248, 202.) The Articles of Incorporation are silent as to the 
amending of organizational documents and CC&R's. (R. 247-248.) 
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3. Subsequent to the filing of its Articles of Incorporation, Highland 
Estates adopted bylaws. (R. 250-260, 202.) 
4. The bylaws do not specifically require that all voting be done at a 
meeting. (R. 251.) However, the bylaws do provide that if a quorum is not present at a duly 
held meeting of members, the meeting may be adjourned to a later date. At the reconvened 
meeting, the members and proxy holders present constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business. The bylaws also provide that all inaccuracies and/or irregularities in calls, notices 
of meetings and in the manner of voting, shall be deemed waived if no objection is made at 
the meeting. (R. 251.) 
5. Annual member meetings were attended by very few members. The 
lack of attendance made it impossible for the Board of Trustees to transact any business 
without holding a reconvened meeting. (R. 203.) 
6. The Board of Trustees, during 1993 and 1994, determined that the 1972 
CC&R's needed to be amended. (R. 304.) 
7. In the Spring of 1994, Highland Estate's General Counsel, Scott 
Welling, was asked by the Board of Trustees to draft an Amendment to Declarations and 
Restrictive and Protective Covenants ("Amended CC&R's"). A draft was presented to the 
members in attendance at the Association's 1994 annual meeting held in June, 1994. 
Attorney Welling was present at the annual meeting and advised the members present with 
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regard to the legal aspects of the proposed changes. (R. 303-308.) There were not enough 
members present at the June 1994 meeting to constitute a quorum. (R. 262.) 
8. At the conclusion of the discussions, everyone present voted to accept 
the Amended CC&R's and to allow until July 15, 1994 for comment. (R. 262.) 
9. It was suggested, by Mr. Welling, at the June 1994 meeting that the vote 
on the Amended CC&R's be undertaken by means of a written ballot, to be delivered to all 
members, along with a copy of the draft Amended CC&R's. (R. 262, 305.) 
10. At the suggestion of Mr. Welling, the trustees, and all members present 
at the 1994 annual meeting, agreed that the most effective and fair way to inform the greatest 
number of homeowners of the proposed changes to the 1972 CC&R's was by mail-in written 
ballot. (R. 305, 262.) 
11. Efforts to ensure as much input from the owners on the proposed 
amendment cost the Association several thousand dollars more in attorney's fees and copy 
costs, let alone the time and effort of individual Board members and Officers that would not 
have been extended in submitting the Amended CC&R's to members at a reconvened 
meeting. (R. 305-306.) 
12. The Plaintiffs were not present at the June, 1994 meeting. (R. 206.) 
13. On August 23,1994, Attorney Welling, on behalf of Highland Estates, 
prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates stating that a copy of the proposed 
amendment to the 1972 CC&R's was attached to the letter and a ballot to officially register 
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each member's vote of the proposed amendments to the CC&R's. (R. 306.) The letter 
indicated that the Amendment had the approval of the Board of Trustees and over forty 
homeowners in attendance at the annual meeting in June, 1994. Attorney Welling explained 
the purpose of the Amendment and requested that ballots be returned no later than 
November 30, 1994. (R. 158,305-307.) 
14. Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft of the 
Amended CC&R's was to be hand delivered to each of the members of Highland Estates. 
(R.305.) 
15. In August, 1994, Plaintiffs received by hand delivery the letter from 
Attorney Welling, a voting ballot and a draft of the Amended CC&R's. (R. 205, 233.) 
16. The Plaintiffs did not lodge an objection to the Amended CC&R's, nor 
did they vote on the CC&R's. In fact, Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to the CC&R's 
until the CC&R's had been ratified by a majority of the members of Highland Estates and 
had been recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office. (R. 205, 233-234.) 
17. In January, 1995, the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates sent a 
newsletter to each homeowner stating that the voting period for the Amended CC&R's had 
been extended and encouraged members who had not voted to do so. (R. 264.) 
18. The voting deadline of November 30, 1994, was never intended to be 
an automatic cut-off date for submission, merely an inducement to motivate homeowners 
to act as soon as possible. (R. 306.) A majority of member owners voted in favor of the 
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Amended CC&R's, the vote on the Amended CC&R's was 149 in favor, 26 opposed and 
87 who did not respond. (R. 306.) 
19. On September 28,1995, Highland Estates held its annual homeowners 
meeting at 7:30 p.m. at the Bums Fire Station. The minutes of the annual meeting reflect 
that an announcement had been made that the Amended CC&R's had been approved by the 
majority of homeowners, that the ballots would be verified and upon completion, the 
Amended CC&R's would be recorded with the County. The sign-in sheet indicated that 
Plaintiffs were not present at the September 28, 1995 meeting. (R. 266-267.) 
20. On October 5, 1995, Highland Estates caused to be filed with the 
Summit County Recorder's Office, the Amended CC&R's. (R. 270-280.) 
21. On January 16, 1997, the Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint and 
served the CoEiplaint upon Highland Estates. The Complaint alleged that certain past and 
present members of the Board of Trustees had breached their fiduciary duty with respect to 
the manner in which the voting was conducted for the amendment to the 1972 CC&R's. (R. 
3-4.) 
22. On January 21, 1997, the Plaintiffs caused to be filed in the Third 
Judicial Court of Summit County a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order asking the 
Court to enjoin the Highland Estate's Board of Trustees from enforcing the Amended 
CC&R's, and enjoining the Board of Trustees from convening the meeting of the members 
of the Highland Estates which was currently scheduled for January 23, 1997. It was not 
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until September 26, 1997, that Plaintiffs noticed a hearing on their Temporary Restraining 
Order. (R. 165-166.) 
23. On April 25, 1997, the Plaintiffs through their First Request For 
Production of Documents requested the voting ballots which had been submitted by 
members on the Amended CC&R's. (R. 1153.) 
24. On May 29,1997, Highland Estates objected to the Request stating that 
the information sought was not relevant or calculated to lead to discoverable evidence and 
that the information sought was highly personal and proprietary. (R. 1154.) 
25. Following Highland Estate's objection to the Plaintiffs' request for the 
voting ballots, the Plaintiffs did not seek to compel the production of the voting ballots. 
The Plaintiffs had over six months before the discovery cut-off date of December 21,1997 
in which to file a motion to compel the production of the voting ballots. The Plaintiffs failed 
to file a Motion to Compel. (R. 1154.) 
26. On September 30,1997, Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order was heard by the Honorable Pat D. Brian. Judge Brian, having reviewed the 
documents filed and having heard oral argument, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order stating in minute entry that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden 
as per the rules. At the hearing on September 30, 1997, Judge Brian scheduled a two-day 
bench trial for January 22 and 23,1998 with apre-trial conference set for January 14,1998. 
(R. 167.) 
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27. Before the scheduled trial date, Highland Estates filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which was folly briefed by both the Plaintiffs and Highland Estates. 
Affidavits were submitted and the matter came on for oral argument at a hearing before the 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring on January 9,1998. The hearing was held two weeks before 
the scheduled trial of January 22 and 23. (R. 1084-1144.) At the hearing the undisputed 
evidence before Judge Nehring was that the ballots had been delivered to all members (R. 
1132) and that the ballots had been properly counted and a majority of votes received in 
favor of the amendment. (R. 1133.) From the bench, Judge Nerhing granted partial 
summary judgment to Highland Estates, holding as a matter of law, that the Board of 
Trustees acted properly in the amendment of the 1972 CC&R's. (R. 1130.) 
28. At the hearing, Counsel for Plaintiff requested that the ruling be 
certified for appeal and Counsel for Defendants so stipulated. (R. 1135-1143.) 
29. On May 28, 1998, the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring issued an Order 
granting Partial Summary Judgment for Highland Estates. (R. 467-471.) 
30. The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring issued specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law holding, as a matter of law, that the actions taken by the Trustees of 
Highland Estates, that led to the adoption of the Amended CC&R's, were proper and that 
the mail-in ballot voting procedures substantially complied with the by-laws and the 1972 
CC&R's, and that no prejudice to the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result 
of mail-in balloting. (R. 470.) 
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31. Subsequent to the Court's Order granting in part and denying in part 
Highland Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs secured the affidavits of 
Michael Ferrigno and Christie Bambery on July 8, 1998. (R. 473.) 
32. Mr. Ferrigno indicated in his Affidavit that he had been a property 
owner in the Highland Estates subdivision since January of 1994. (R. 473.) 
33. Several months after the issuance of Judge Nehring's Order granting 
Highland Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Rebecca LeVanger, using her 
newly acquired position on the Board of Directors wrongfully secured the voting ballots, 
circumventing discovery procedures, and made copies of the ballots. (R. 512.) 
34. On July 15, 1998, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider Judge 
Nehring's Order Granting Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Certify the Order as 
Final and Appealable Pursuant to Rule 54(b). (R. 479.) Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 
was premised upon an argument that the ballots had not been counted properly because some 
of the ballots had not been signed by both joint tenants. (R. 479-500.) 
35. On October 7, 1998, after hearing argument on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider, Judge Pat. B. Brian denied the Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider, finding that the 
new evidence submitted by Plaintiffs was available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary 
judgment was argued and granted. 
36. Because of the earlier stipulation of the parties, Judge Brian agreed to 
certify Judge Nehring's Partial Summary Judgment Order for Appeal. (R. 1063-1066.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES WITH RESPECT TO 
AMENDING THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WAS PROPER, AND 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH STATE STATUTES AND THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION. 
A. The Trial Court Applied the Proper Standard of Review of the Actions 
of the Board of Trustees. 
As the trial court in this matter properly stated "few things are more fundamental 
to Corporations . . . than this process by which those entities amend their charters or their 
beginning documents." (R. 1130.) Much discussion has taken place in the appellate courts 
around the country as to the standard of judicial review which should be given to the actions 
of a non-profit governing board, including those of homeowners associations. See 
Levanduskv v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.. 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990); 
In re Croton River Club. Inc.. 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2nd Cir. 1995). The appellate court in 
Levanduskv recognized that competing concerns exist and that the standard for judicial 
review of the actions of a homeowners association governing board must be sensitive to a 
variety of concerns. Levanduskv, 553 N.E.2d at 1321. On the one hand, there must be some 
method of check and balance to prevent members of a governing board from abusive 
exercise of their power, while on the other hand, courts must not undermine the purposes 
for which the governing board was formed including the "protection of the interests of the 
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entire community of residents in an environment managed by the Board for the common 
benefit." Id at 1321. 
The Levanduskv court concluded that these competing goals were best served by 
a standard of review that is analogous to the business judgment rule applied by courts to 
determine challenges to decisions made by corporate directors. IcLat 1321 (citing Auerback 
v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979)). The court stated that "a number of courts in this 
and other states have applied such a standard in reviewing the decisions of co-operative and 
condominium boards." Id. at 1321. The Levanduskv court went on to explain that the 
business judgment rule prohibits judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors "taken 
in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance 
of a corporate purpose." Ld at 1321; see Auerback. 393 N.E.2d at 999. 
Additionally, in Burke v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders & Exhibitors 
Assoc, et al„ 1997, WL277999 (Tenn. App.), the trial court, in a derivative action such as 
this, was asked to declare a vote of the members null and void because the votes had not 
been counted pursuant to the governing documents of the Association. Id. at *7-9. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the Association holding that there was a policy against 
substituting the judgment of a court for the judgment of a corporate board. Id_The appeals 
court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. The court held that this policy was reflected in 
the business judgment rule. Id. at *5, *9. The appeals court, quoting the trial court stated 
as follows: 
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The executive committee therefore faced a situation in which the 
bylaws could not be applied strictly as written because they could not 
ascertain what ballots were in the post office on October 15th. The 
executive committee opted for a course of action reasonably 
calculated to comply substantially with the bylaws . . . even if the 
approach was not the most prudent and was not expressly approved 
by the bylaws, it was not forbidden by the bylaws and in fact, was 
consistent with the corporation's prior procedure .... This trial court 
exercises its discretion not to render a declaratory judgment on the -*— 
validity of an election to the board of a non-profit corporation where 
the duly responsible subdivision of the corporation determines how # 
best to conduct an election which is impossible to conduct with 
absolute precision under the terms of the bylaws . . . . >— 
It is particularly inappropriate to entertain a declaratory judgment ^ 
action when the complaining parties did not raise the issue before the 
executive committee, the full board or the membership at their 
meetings . . . . 
Idat*14. 
It is clear from the record that the trial court in the case at hand applied a standard 
of review similar to that standard applied in Levandusky and Burke. From the evidence in 
the record at the time of the oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial 
court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the actions taken by the Trustees that led to the 
adoption of the Amended CC&R's were proper. In determining that the Board of Trustees' 
decision to seek approval to amend the Restrictive Covenants by mail-in ballot was proper, 
the trial court reviewed the objective of the Utah statutes and the organizational documents 
in decision making procedures to affect changes and amendments to the organic documents 
and determined that the primary objective was to encourage participation and to invite and 
solicit the votes of as many members as possible with respect to those issues. (R. 47.) 
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The court found, as a matter of law, that the bylaws were unambiguous in so far 
as they set out a procedure for amendment. (R. 47.) The trial court also found, as a matter 
of law, that the restrictive covenants, as they existed, did not expressly require that 
amendment to the 1972 CC&R's be adopted in the context of a meeting. (R. 47.) The trial 
court correctly concluded that the question became: did the alternative voting procedure 
substantially comply with the terms of the bylaws and CC&R's. The trial court then 
concluded that the Board of Trustees had substantially complied with those provisions. In 
so doing, the trial court made a determination based upon the facts in the record at the time 
that, as a matter of law, the mail-in voting process provided protections and resulted in no 
prejudice to the members. The trial court stated that in so far as the record at that time was 
concerned, notice had been provided to everyone who should have received notice. The 
court also concluded that there was collateral support in that a majority of'yes' votes came 
in indicating that the notice had been provided to the members. 
Finally, based upon the record before the trial court, the trial court determined 
that the voting process had integrity. There was no evidence that the votes were not counted 
properly. Moreover, a majority of homeowners did actually vote for the amendment. The 
Plaintiffs offered no evidence to the trial court to dispute that all members had not received 
the mail-in ballot, or that the votes had not been properly counted.1 Accordingly, the trial 
1
 Plaintiffs did not contest these issues of fact until after the summary judgment 
hearing. Several months following the hearing Plaintiff attempted to use three affidavits to create 
an issue of fact with respect to the manner in which notice was provided to homeowners and the 
manner in which the votes were counted. These affidavits became the subject of Plaintiffs' 
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court was correct in ruling that, as a matter of law, the Board of Trustees had acted properly 
as it related to the amendment of the 1972 CC&R's. 
B. The Mail-in Balloting Process Is Not Prohibited by Utah Law. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court was incorrect for granting partial summary 
judgment because Utah law does not allow the amendment of restrictive covenants to be 
conducted by mail-in ballot and that Utah law only provides for voting through in-person 
meetings. Plaintiffs are wrong. Just the opposite is true, Utah, unlike many other states, 
does allow members or shareholders to vote without being present at a meeting.2 
The provisions of Utah's Non-Pro fit Corporations and Co-operative Association 
Act ("Act"), as cited by Plaintiffs, provide great flexibility in the voting process of the 
members of a non-profit association. For example, U.C.A. section 16-6-29 (1953 as 
amended), states simply, that any number of members present in person or represented by 
proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of members.3 Accordingly, U.C.A. section 
Motion to Reconsider. Highland Estates has addressed the Motion to Reconsider in Point II 
below. 
2
 U.C.A. section 16-6-30 (1953 as Amended). A member may vote in person or, 
unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws otherwise provide, may vote by proxy executed 
in writing by the member or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact. Where trustees or officers 
are to be elected by members, the governing board by resolution or the bylaws may provide that 
such elections may be conducted by mail. 
3
 U.C.A. section 16-6-29. The articles of incorporation or bylaws may provide the 
number or percentage of members entitled to vote represented in person or by proxy where the 
number or percentage of votes represented in person or by proxy, which shall constitute a 
quorum at a meeting of members. In the absence of any such provision, the members present in 
person or represented by proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of members. The vote 
of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the members present or represented by proxy at a 
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16-6-29 would actually allow one member to be a quorum at any meeting. Additionally, 
U.C.A. section 16-6-30 allows members to vote by proxy. It also allows election votes to 
be conducted by mail. 
Plaintiffs cite U.C.A. section 16-6-33 for the proposition that all action must be 
taken at a meeting of the members unless all members agree to take action without a 
meeting. However, a reading of the statute reveals that the only action required to be taken 
at a meeting is an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation.4 Nowhere does the Act 
require an in-person meeting to take action to amend restrictive covenants or CC&R's. In 
fact, the only action required by the Act to be taken at a meeting of members is the 
amendment of the articles of incorporation. The Act in no way contemplates an in-person 
meeting to take action to amend restrictive covenants or CC&R's. In fact, the Act 
contemplates great flexibility by the association and trustees. The Act expressly allows one 
of the most sacred of all voting actions the voting related to the election of trustees, to occur 
by mail-in balloting. See U.C.A. § 16-6-30 (1953 as amended). 
meeting at which a quorum was initially present shall be necessary for the adoption of any matter 
voted on by the members unless a greater proportion is required by this Act, the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws. 
4
 U.C.A. section 16-6-33. Any action required by this Act to be taken at a meeting 
of the members or trustees of a non-profit corporation, or any action which may be taken at a 
meeting of the members or trustees may be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing, 
setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all the members entitled to vote with respect 
to the subject matter thereof, or all of the trustees as the case may be . . . . 
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Clearly, the spirit of the Act is to allow the associations themselves to control the 
inner-workings of the entity. The Act is simply a safety net, requiring minimal procedural 
guidelines when none have been provided in the organizational documents of the non-profit 
entity. 
C. The Organizational Documents Do Not Prohibit Voting By 
Mail-In Ballot. 
Plaintiffs argue that the organizational documents of Highland Estates, which 
existed at the time of the proposed amendment of the 1972 CC&R's, prohibited voting by 
mail-in ballot. The organizational documents which existed at the time of the proposed 
amendment of the 1972 CC&R's were: (1) Articles of Incorporation; (2) Bylaws of the 
Corporation; and (3) the 1972 CC&R's. 
First, the 1972 CC&R's themselves contain the following language with respect 
to amendment: 
These conditions shall run with the land and shall be binding upon all 
parties and all persons claiming under them until March 10,1982, at 
which time said conditions and covenants shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods often (10) years unless by vote of the 
owners of a majority of the lots in said subdivision, it is agreed to 
change said conditions in whole or in part. 
(R. 245.) Nothing in the 1972 CC&R's mandates that the vote on amending the 1972 
CC&R's be done at an in-person meeting. Clearly, any reasonable means of securing a 
majority vote is contemplated in the language of the 1972 CC&R's. 
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Second, while the Bylaws do not specifically address the amendment of 
CC&R's, the Bylaws do specifically state that only a majority vote is necessary to decide any 
question, unless a different vote is required by statute or by the other organizational 
documents.5 Additionally, the Bylaws provide that members and holders of proxies of more 
than fifty percent (50%) of the total votes of the association constitutes a quorum. However, 
if a quorum is not present at a meeting, the Bylaws allow a reconvened meeting to occur and 
if properly noticed, whoever appears at the reconvened meeting represents a quorum for the 
transaction of business.6 Moreover, all irregularities in the "manner of voting" are deemed 
waived if no objection is made at the meeting. (R. 251.) 
At the annual meeting of members for 1994, the Amended CC&R's were 
discussed in great detail. The Amended CC&R's were discussed page by page with input 
and changes from members present. (R. 262.) All members present at the 1994 annual 
meeting voted to accept the changes to the 1972 CC&R's and agreed to allow until July 15, 
5
 Section 2.5 - Voting Requirements. When a quorum is present in person or 
represented by proxy at any meeting, the vote of a majority of the membership present in person 
or by proxy shall decide any question brought before such meeting . . . . (R. 251.) 
6
 Section 2.7 - Quorum. At any meeting of the members, the presence of members 
holding, or holders of proxies entitled to cast, more than fifty (50%) of the total votes of the 
association shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. In the event a quorum is not 
present at a meeting, the members present (whether represented in person or by proxy), though 
less than a quorum may adjourn the meeting to a later date. Notice thereof shall be delivered to 
the members as provided above at the reconvened meeting, the members and proxy holders 
present shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. (R. 251.) 
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1994 for any further input from members. Additionally, the minutes of the 1994 annual 
meeting reflect that all members present voted to allow all members not present to vote on 
the Amended CC&R's by mail-in ballot. (R. 262.) 
No one at the 1994 annual meeting objected to the use of mail-in ballots. (R. 
262.) The Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that they were not present at the 1994 
annual meeting of members. They also stated that even after they received the voting ballot 
and proposed amendment to the 1972 CC&R's, they lodged no objection to the Amended 
CC&R's nor the manner in which the voting occurred. Finally, Highland Estate's Articles 
of Incorporation are silent as to the voting practices and procedures of the association. 
Clearly, the organizational documents of the association do not prohibit voting 
by mail-in ballot. The Bylaws of the association clearly and unambiguously contemplate 
great flexibility in the manner of voting and were designed with the clear purpose of 
allowing needed changes to occur even if participation was minimal. Additionally, the 
Bylaws allowed for flexibility in the manner that voting occurred by providing that all 
irregularities in the manner of voting had to be objected to at the meeting or all objections 
were deemed to be waived. 
There can be no doubt that the trial court was correct in ruling that the board of 
trustees acted reasonably and properly in their desire to involve more members in the voting 
process, and actually went beyond what was required by the Bylaws in obtaining a true 
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majority vote by mail-in ballot. (R. 47-51.) Clearly, the board of trustees substantially 
complied with Utah law and the organizational documents of the association. 
I) The Trial Court Did Not Incorrectly View Mail-In Balloting as the 
Effective Equivalent of Soliciting Proxies. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court was incorrectly "persuaded by the 
argument that, since proxies are allowed at in-person meetings, mail-in balloting does not 
injure any fundamental purpose of governance." (Appellants' Brief p. 15.) The Plaintiffs 
have severely misconstrued the trial court's reasoning. As it pertains to proxies, the trial 
court simply used the allowance of proxies by the organizational documents to undercut the 
Plaintiffs' argument that an actual meeting was necessary to encourage the vigorous 
exchange of views. (R. 50.) 
The Plaintiffs argue that in-person meetings are necessary to provide meaningful 
input on issues and actions. In support of this argument, the Plaintiffs refer to the affidavit 
of Christie Bambery. The Plaintiffs' argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, the 
Bambery affidavit cannot be presented as evidence on appeal. The Bambery affidavit was 
not part of the record at the time the Summary Judgment motion was argued and ruled upon. 
The Bambery affidavit came several months later as part of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
reconsideration. 
Second, the Board of Trustees did, at the 1994 annual meeting, dedicate the 
majority of the meeting to discussing in great detail the proposed amendments to the 1972 
CC&R's. The minutes of the 1994 annual meeting reflect that after a detailed discussion, 
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every member present at the 1994 annual member meeting voted to accept the changes and 
to allow mail-in voting to occur. (R. 262.) Again, the Plaintiffs were not present to provide 
vigorous exchange of views. Accordingly, a meeting was dedicated to an in-depth 
discussion of the proposed changes to the restrictive covenants and the manner of voting on 
the amendment to the restrictive covenants. 
The Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was incorrect in giving any weight -
to the argument that the balloting process was a better alternative than a reconvened -
meeting. Plaintiffs' argument is premised on their contention that the 1972 CC&R's could 
not be amended by a reconvened meeting. Plaintiffs are arguing from both sides of the 
fence. They attempt to use the Bylaws as evidence that an in-person meeting was required 
to amend the 1972 CC&R's yet, on the other hand, they argue that the Bylaws have no 
application to amending the 1972 CC&R's. 
In support of this argument, the Plaintiffs attempt to apply the notion that the 
more specific provisions of the 1972 CC&R's controlled over the general provisions of the 
Bylaws. It is clear, however, from a simple reading of both provisions, that the Bylaws are 
much more specific than the general language of the 1972 CC&R's. The 1972CC&R'sare 
silent as to the manner of voting. They simply state that amendment requires a vote of 
members owning a majority of the lots. They do not state that the vote must take place at 
a in-person meeting. The trial court was correct in finding, that as a matter of law, the 
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Bylaws were unambiguous. The Bylaws are clearly more specific than the 1972 CC&R's 
as to the voting process. 
E. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Was Before the Trial Court as To the 
Integrity of the Voting Process. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the mail-in balloting was unlawful because the voting 
process was flawed. However, all evidence provided by the Plaintiffs in this regard was 
acquired months after the Summary Judgment had been granted by the trial court. The state 
of the Record, at the time of the granting of Summary Judgment is clear. There were no 
genuine issues of material fact in the record relating to the integrity of voting process. The 
facts in the record were undisputed, that adequate notice was provided to all members, that 
all votes were properly counted, and that a majority of members eligible to vote did indeed 
vote in favor of the amendment. (R. 1133.) 
As discussed below, Plaintiffs are precluded from arguing on Appeal that there 
is an issue of fact as to whether all homeowners eligible to vote actually received the voting 
packet and whether the votes were properly counted. As discussed below, Plaintiffs had 
ample opportunity during the discovery process to gather this information and present it to 
the trial court in a timely manner for the trial court's consideration when ruling upon 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot now raise 
the issues on appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROPERLY 
REVIEWED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider Under Rules 54(b) and 60(b). 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not consider 
the probative value of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (Appellants' Brief, p. 22.) 
Plaintiffs assert that Rule 54(b) required Judge Brian to review the pleadings and evidence 
submitted by Plaintiffs before making his ruling.7 (IcL) Such an assertion is not in keeping 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or with Utah case law. Rule 54(b) provides in 
pertinent part that in the absence of a final determination and direction, a judgment upon 
multiple claims "is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Nothing 
in this rule requires a trial court to revisit a partial summary judgment. Instead, the rule only 
provides that such an order is "subject to" revision. Before revisiting such an order a trial 
court must have reason to do so. The reasons for relief from such an order are found in Rule 
60(b). See In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,12 (Utah 
1999) (holding that in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying 
a motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment, appellate courts look to the standards 
7
 Plaintiffs further allege that "the trial court incorrectly applied a standard of review 
based on Rule 56 ...." (Appellants' Brief, p. 23.) However, there is nothing in the record 
supporting the notion that Judge Brian relied on Rule 56. Instead, the record shows that Judge 
Brian applied the standards set forth in Rules 54(b) and 60(b). (R. 1047.) 
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set forth in Rule 60(b); Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup. 
921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996)). The Rule states in pertinent part: 
On motion . . . the court may . . . relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial. . .; (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 
the judgment has been satisfied...; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 
3 months after the judgment.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Without such a reason, it would be pointless for 
a 
court to review a prior order. 
Applying this standard Utah courts have found that "new evidence must be 
submitted and it must; (i) be such as it could not with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered and produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; (ii) not be 
merely cumulative; and (iii) be such as to render a different result probable." In re 
Determination of the Rights to Use Water, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (citing State v. 
Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) (refusing to grant a motion for a new trial where new 
evidence did not meet these standards)); see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 
1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "[a] court can consider several factors in 
determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, but are not 
limited to, when . . . (3) a party offers new evidence"). As Plaintiffs point out, Motions to 
25 
I 
Reconsider should be denied when, ain the case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion 
fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is 
introduced." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Appellants'Brief, p. 24. ' 
In this case, Judge Brian properly reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 
under Rules 54(b) and 60(b). After a foil hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Judge 
Brian found that: 
The record is undisputed that at the time summary judgment was 
argued and granted, there was no request by Plaintiffs for a 
continuance in order to conduct additional discovery; secondly, there 
was no motion to compel discovery either prior to or at the time of 
motion for summary judgment; and, three, it is undisputed that 
evidence relating to what is now offered as newly discovered 
evidence was, in fact, available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary 
judgment was argued and granted. 
(R. 1047.) Judge Brian, authorized to review Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider under Rule 
54(b), applied the standards set forth in Rule 60(b) and found that Plaintiffs' Motion 
presented no "newly discovered evidence." (R. 1047.) As such, Judge Brian's review of 
Plaintiffs' Motion was proper and cannot be considered an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiffs rely on Timm for the proposition that Rule 54(b) requires that the trial 
court must examine a Motion to Reconsider on its substantive merits. Timm v. Dewsnup, 
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). Timm involved a Motion to Reconsider which was denied 
when the trial court found that such a motion did not exist under the Utah Rules. Id. at 
1184. In reversing that finding, the Utah Supreme Court held that "pursuant to the 
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provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary judgment was 'subject to revision,' a motion 
to reconsider is a reasonable means of requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted." 
Id at 1185. However, nothing from the decision shows that the trial court in the instant case 
abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion. The instant case involves a trial court 
which, while recognizing that a Motion to Reconsider exists under the Utah Rules, denied 
to grant the motion because Plaintiffs had waived their opportunity to discover the ballots, 
and because the ballots did not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence.' (R. 1047.) Such 
findings are commonly upheld by Utah courts. See. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 43-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of motion to 
reconsider when motion did not fulfill the requirements of the 'newly discovered evidence' 
Rule).8 
The instant case is similar to In Re Determination of the Rights to Use Water, 368 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. There the Utah Supreme Court heard a case where the trial court had 
denied plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider an Order granting Partial Summary Judgment. Id. 
at 12. Though the Plaintiffs had supported their Motion with an affidavit, the trial court 
ruled that since the affidavit presented no new evidence the Motion could not be considered. 
8
 Appellants' citation of Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
1979) is likewise misplaced. There the court explained that Rule 54(b) expressly states that "a 
trial judge should have the opportunity for reconsideration in such cases since it facilitates the 
just and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court." Id. at 536-37. While Rule 54(b) 
provides a trial judge with the "opportunity for reconsideration," nothing in the Rule provides 
that a trial judge must consider a Motion to Reconsider when Plaintiffs present no reason, such as 
new evidence, to do so. 
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Id In affirming the trial courts' decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] trial 
court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment is reviewed under Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). The court found that since the affidavit did not constitute "newly discovered 
evidence" the trial court "did not abuse its discretion . . . in refusing to reconsider the 
[plaintiffs'] summary judgment." Id. 
Though factually different, the instant case presents an identical situation. Here 
Plaintiffs asked the trial court to reconsider a partial summary judgment based on evidence 
which could have been properly sought prior to the summary judgment ruling. (R. 1047.) 
As such, Plaintiffs' evidence does not qualify under the 'newly discovered evidence' 
standard required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court. 
Because Plaintiffs presented the trial court with no 'newly discovered evidence' the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that it could not consider Plaintiffs' Motion. 
(R. 1047.); see In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12; 
J.V. Hatch Const. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8,11 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Rothwell 
Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co.. 827F.2d246,251 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that for trial court 
to relieve party from an order on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the evidence must 
satisfy the Rule 60(b) requirements). 
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B. Plaintiffs Do Not Qualify Under the 'Newly Discovered 
Evidence' Standard. 
Because the voting ballots do not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence' under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because Plaintiffs failed to properly attempt to 
discover the voting ballots, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. The voting ballots do not qualify under this standard for 
three reasons. First, the ballots do not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence.' The voting 
ballots were the subject of a discovery dispute during which Plaintiffs failed to exercise any 
diligence in discovering the ballots. Plaintiffs requested the ballots through their first 
request for production of documents. (R. 1153.) Highland Estates objected to Plaintiffs' 
request on the basis that the ballots would reveal highly personal information about those 
who voted to amend the CC&R's. (R. 1154.) Plaintiffs failed to seek to compel the 
production of the ballots and failed to request a continuance in order that they may discover 
the ballots. (R. 1045, 1047, 1154.) Following Judge Nehring's Order granting partial 
summary, Plaintiffs obtained copies of the ballots only through Mrs. LeVanger's new 
position on the homeowners association Board of Trustees. (R. 512.) Thus, Plaintiffs failed 
to exercise reasonable diligence to discover and produce evidence which was available to 
them. Plaintiffs failed to file a motion compelling production of the ballots. Plaintiffs 
further failed to request a continuance granting them more time to discover the ballots. Such 
failures can not rise to the level of diligent discovery. Thus, the ballots do not qualify as 
'newly discovered evidence.' See Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Insurance Co.. 561 F.Supp. 
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( 
656, 665 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that the moving party must establish that through due 
i 
diligence the newly discovered evidence could not have been discovered while the summary 
judgment motion was pending). As the Keene court has stated: 
Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct ' 
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered 
evidence. Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle 
to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during 
pendency of the summary judgment motion. The non-movant has an « 
affirmative duty to come forward to meet a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment. r 
Keene, 561 F.Supp. at 666. m 
Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to provide the trial court with any justification as to 
why the affidavits submitted with Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider were not filed while 
Highland Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure preclude Plaintiffs from arguing that the affidavit could not have been produced 
at the time the Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. Rule 56(f) provides that: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Thus, had Plaintiffs been concerned about the availability of the 
affidavits for the court to consider in regard to Highland Estates' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it could have taken the necessary precautions provided by the Rules. 
30 
In addition, Rule 56(c) requires that motions, memoranda and affidavits 
pertaining to a motion for summary judgment "shall be filed and served in accordance with 
CJA 4-501." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 4-501(l)(B) requires that "the responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation." Since Plaintiffs did not file 
the affidavits with their Memorandum in Opposition to Highland Estates' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the affidavits cannot now be considered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs did 
not exercise 'due diligence' in bringing to light the evidence which was discoverable during 
the time the Court considered and granted Highland Estates' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Second, the fact that Plaintiffs failed to fulfill the Rule 60(b) 'due diligence' 
requirement in regard to the ballots constitutes a waiver which procedurally precludes 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. The trial court stated that: 
The Court finds that procedurally the Plaintiffs had an opportunity to 
either conduct additional discovery, compel discovery that was 
outstanding and unresponded to or to seek a continuance for those 
purposes. Their failure to do so constitutes a waiver, and 
procedurally the Court finds that there is simply no basis for the 
setting aside of the summary judgment granted by Judge Nehring in 
behalf of the Defendants. 
(R. 1047.) 
Plaintiffs had over six months in which to attempt to discover the voting ballots. 
(R. 1154.) They did not present the ballots to the court until long after the summary 
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judgment hearing. (R. 512.) Failure by Plaintiffs to diligently pursue the ballots through 
the proper discovery process constitutes a waiver. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Baglev & Co., 863 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reversed on other grounds) 
(holding that party's inaction can result in procedural waiver of evidentiary hearing). When 
Plaintiffs fail to properly conduct diligent discovery they should not be allowed to 
circumvent the discovery procedures and present such evidence after summary judgment. 
Such conduct violates the principles of discovery and judicial economy. 
Third, Plaintiffs do not qualify under the Rule 60(b) 'newly discovered evidence' 
standard because they circumvented discovery procedures in order to obtain copies of the 
voting ballots. When Plaintiffs originally attempted to discover the voting ballots, 
Defendants objected to their discovery. (R. 1153-54.) Defendants had assured the 
homeowners association members that their votes would be held confidential and were 
concerned that disclosure of the personal information contained on the ballots could be used 
to embarrass or persecute those who had voted for changes in the CC&R's. (R. 1046.) 
Plaintiffs then failed to address Defendants' objections and failed to file a motion to compel. 
(R. 1047.) Subsequently Mrs. LeVanger was elected to the Highland Estates Board of 
Trustees, the very board against whom she had filed suit. (R. 800, 1042.) Mrs. LeVanger 
then used this newly obtained position to secure copies of the voting records, despite 
Defendants'objections. (R. 1042.) Such behavior constitutes a blatant conflict of interest 
in that Mrs. LeVanger knowingly used her new position to obtain records which Defendants 
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had specifically objected to her having. Mrs. LeVanger's conflict of interest is especially 
apparent considering that she was now a member of the very board against whom she had 
filed suit. (R. 1047.) Mrs. LeVanger's circumvention of the discovery procedures 
constitutes unfair surprise and a breach of the principles and procedures underlying the 
discovery process. As such, Plaintiffs should not be permitted to present evidence obtained 
in such a way, in an untimely manner, when such evidence could have been obtained 
through proper procedures before summary judgment. 
C. Plaintiffs Waived Their Right to Object to Judge 
Brian's Decision to Hear Oral Argument Without First 
Reviewing the Additional Evidence Submitted by 
Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court (the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian) abused its 
discretion by not reviewing the pleadings or evidence submitted by Plaintiff before making 
its ruling denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. However, the record establishes that the 
Plaintiffs have waived any right to object to the court ruling on its Motion without first 
reviewing the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of their Motion to Reconsider. 
Plaintiffs counsel, after learning that the court had not reviewed any of the 
pleadings submitted in relation to the Motion to Reconsider, agreed to proceed with oral 
argument, without objection. (R. 1041-1042.) Moreover, Plaintiffs counsel agreed, at the 
conclusion of the oral argument to submit the Motion for Reconsideration for decision at 
that time. Specifically, the transcript of the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider 
states as follows: 
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The court: Anything further anybody else would like to say before 
the court rules? Do you submit? (R. 1047.) 
Mr. Sheen: Yes, your Honor. (R. 1047.) 
By agreeing to submit the motion to reconsider to the court for decision 
immediately after oral argument, Plaintiff has waived his right to "now allege that the trial 
court abused his discretion by not reviewing the pleadings submitted." Plaintiffs, surely, 
cannot be allowed to agree to submit the Motion to Reconsider to the court for decision, 
thereby attempting to lead the trial court into error. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be 
precluded from arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not reviewing the 
pleadings prior to ruling on Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above this Court should hold that the trial court 
correctly found that the actions of the Highland Estates Board of Trustees, with respect to 
amending the CC&R's, substantially complied with Utah law and with the Association's 
organizational documents. This Court should further hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
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DATED this pQ day of September, 1999. 
STRONG^ HANNI 
Ifaj?-
aul M. Belnap 
H. Burt Ringwood 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &V day of September, 1999, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to: 
E.Jay Sheen 
ROBINSON & SHEEN 
1366 East Murray-HoUaday Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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(Whereupon, the following proceedings 
continued in open court:) 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. We're here this morning on the Levanger v, 
Vincent et al matter, 970300011. Counsel, please 
state appearances for the record. 
MR. RINGWOOD: Burt Ringwood and Paul Belnap 
for the defendant Highland Estates Property Owners 
Association. 
MR. SHEEN: Jay Sheen for the Levangers, your 
Honor 
THE COURT: Good morning. It's good to have 
you up here. I've reviewed your papers, and who's 
going to argue this? 
MR. RINGWOOD: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're up. 
MR. RINGWOOD: Your Honor, just as a 
preliminary matter, you may or may not know that 
this - - that the motion that we filed on behalf of the 
Home Owners Association was scheduled earlier in 
December for oral argument before Judge Brian, and, 
the day of the hearing, Judge Brian continued the 
4 A r. h 
1 hearing because of personal reasons. And this was the 
2 earliest time that we could get another hearing date. 
3 And I explain that because, as you know, we 
4 have a trial scheduled in this case January 22nd 
5 . before your Honor, and I didn't want you to feel like 
6 we were throwing this thing at you at the last minute. 
7 THE COURT: No. I'm used to it. 
8 MR. RINGWOOD: Okay. Your Honor, Jean and 
9 Becky Levanger brought this action naming as 
10 defendants in their complaint current and past members 
11 of the Highland Estates Property Owners Association, 
12 which is a Utah non-profit corporation, and also 
13 naming the corporation itself as a party. 
14 The complaint alleges two causes of action, 
15 both I believe directed at the individual board 
16 members. The first is breach of fiduciary duty, and 
17 in their duties as board members; and second also a 
18 breach of fiduciary duty by alleging gross 
19 mismanagement. 
20 The case centers around the approval and 
21 recording of some amended restrictive covenants, and 
22 that is the nucleus, or the reason, primary reason, 
23 why we're here today. 
24 As you know, the Levangers are bringing this 
25 action derivatively for and on behalf of the 
Argument: Ringwood 
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corporation; in other words, the action belongs to the 
corporation, not to the Levangers. And any recovery 
belongs to the corporation and not the Levangers. 
I'm here today representing the corporation 
who, along with the Levangers, are the only parties 
before this court. 
Your Honor, as you note from our pleadings, 
we're bringing our motion because we believe that this 
action does not meet the procedural requirements of 
Rule 23.1. We've stated in our documents that we do 
not believe -- and the facts are undisputed -- that 
the Levangers fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the members of the Home Owners 
Association. 
We have set forth in our brief several 
factors that courts look at to determine the adequacy 
of representation, and I want to focus on two of those 
today. They are Numbers 7 and 8: 
The plaintiff's vindictiveness towards the 
defendants and degree of support the 
plaintiff received from the other members 
that he or she purports to represent. 
Now, this is not a typical derivative -- derivative 
action situation. This is not about a majority 
shareholder who is accused of self-dealing with the 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 corporation. In this situation, all of the members 
2 have one vote. All lot owners have one vote. They're 
3 all similarly situated. There are 260 members, 
4 approximately, in this case. 
5 With respect to the issue of vindication, I 
6 would just like to review a few facts with your Honor 
7 that are undisputed in this case. First of all, the 
8 Home Owners Association was established in 1964 by 
9 just a few members at the time, and has since 
10 increased to approximately 260 members. It has an 
11 elected board of trustees made up of nine members of 
12 the association. 
13 A new board is elected every year, and 
14 within the past two months a new board has been 
15 elected, and the election occurs at the annual 
16 meetings of the Home Owners Association. 
17 Now, Jean and Becky Levanger have been 
18 members of the association for approximately twenty 
19 years now, and for many years the association did 
20 require annual assessments because they were required 
21 to take care of the roads; primarily snow removal. 
22 And in the 1980's1 , I believe, the snow 
23 removal was taken over by the county, and the 
24 association did continue the requirement of an annual 
25 assessment. 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 And at that time, they did have some 
2 reserves to cover some of the operating expenses of 
3 the association. 
4 In approximately 1991-92, that timeframe, 
5 the association ran out of their reserves, and the 
6 duly-elected board of trustees at the time, pursuant 
7 to the bylaws, determined that it was necessary again 
8 to have an annual assessment to meet the operating 
9 expenses of the association, and determined that 
10 amount would be $37 per year. 
11 And the Levangers opposed the annual 
12 assessments and testified in their deposition that 
13 when these annual assessments were made, they 
14 determined at that time, back in 1991-92, that 
15 timeframe, that they would not attend any more 
16 meetings of the association, and refused to make any 
17 payment of the annual assessment. 
18 There's no challenge of the procedural 
19 method in which those assessments were made at the 
20 time; they simply decided to take the ball and go 
21 home, and that's what they did. 
22 For the next several years, the Levangers 
23 attended no meetings of the association, and continued 
24 to refuse to make any annual assessments. 
25 Shortly after the board determined that 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 assessments were necessary, they began then working on 
2 amending the restrictive covenants. The covenants 
3 they were working under dated back to 1992. They felt 
4 they were outdated and they needed to be modernized. 
5 So the board, with the assistance of counsel 
6 Scott Welling, who practices in Park City, Utah, they 
7 amended the covenants with the help of Mr. Welling. 
8 And the amended covenants were actually part 
9 of the meeting of Mr. Welling and the board of 
10 trustees at the time, and members of the association 
11 who attended the 1994 annual association meeting. 
12 Now, some confusion existed as to what 
13 procedure was required to get these amended covenants 
14 approved and recorded. 
15 Mr. Welling advised the board of trustees 
16 that they did need a majority of members to pass the 
17 amended covenants. And knowing that it was an 
18 impossibility for the association to get out a 
19 majority at the home owners meeting, Mr. Welling 
20 informed them that they could hold - - pursuant to the 
21 bylcLWS -- a reconvened meeting, and with proper notice 
22 of the reconvened meeting, a majority of members --
23 whoever showed up at the reconvened meeting represents 
24 the majority of the members. That's the fallback to 
25 get anything done in the association. 
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The board was concerned about their method 
of having a reconvened meeting with respect to the 
covenants, because they wanted everybody in the 
association -- even though it wasn't technically 
necessary -- they wanted everybody to have an 
opportunity to vote on the amended CC&R's. 
They expressed the concern with the idea of 
a reconvened meeting. Mr. Welling then proposed that 
they conduct a vote by mail. So it was decided by the 
board and was introduced to the members at the 1994 --
in attendance at the 1994 annual meeting, that they 
would vote on the CC&R's by mail, in ballot; and it 
was agreed at that meeting that they would do that. 
So, subsequent to the 1994 annual meeting, 
each home owner received, by hand delivery, a letter 
from Attorney Welling explaining the circumstances and 
a voting draft of the amended covenants, and a voting 
ballot, with instructions from Mr. Welling as to how 
to vote, and to mail in those votes. 
THE COURT: I didn't see a copy of those 
papers as exhibits to your pleadings. 
MR. RINGWOOD: Of the actual --
THE COURT: Of the Welling letter and of the 
draft CC&R's that went out pursuant to the '94 
meeting. 
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1 MR. RINGWOOD: Yeah, I don't see it, either, 
2 your Honor. We do have copies of that to get to your 
3 Honor. The letter itself -- maybe Mr. Sheen has a 
4 copy - - but the letter itself explained what the 
5 CC&R's were, discussed the amendments to the CC&R's, 
6 then explained voting procedures to the members. And 
7 then there was a voting copy of the CC&R's attached to 
8 the letter, along with the ballot. 
9 The Levangers admitted in their depositions 
10 that they received, by hand delivery, a copy of the 
11 Welling letter, the voting draft of the amended 
12 covenants, and the ballot. 
13 As stated in their deposition, they chose to 
14 do nothing with it. They didn't vote for it, they 
15 didn't vote against it; they just simply ignored the 
16 ballot and did not discuss their concerns with any 
17 board members at the time, and just simply ignored it. 
18 After several months, a majority of members 
19 had approved the amended covenants by mail-in vote. 
20 At the annual meeting in 1995 -- which, again, the 
21 Levangers did not attend -- the board announced that a 
22 majority vote had been received and that the amended 
23 covenant would be recorded, and they were forwarded to 
24 the Recorder in October of 1995. 
25 Shortly after they were recorded, it was 
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1 brought to the attention of the board that they had 
2 inadvertently recorded a draft copy and left out a 
3 provision that they felt was important, so then they 
4 subsequently filed an amendment. 
5 THE COURT: There has been much to do over 
6 this omitted clause in the CC&R's. What was that 
7 about? 
8 MR. RINGWOOD: It was simply just an 
9 oversight. 
10 THE COURT: What was the substance of the 
11 provision? 
12 MR. RINGWOOD: Well, the provision itself 
13 that was omitted was the provision which provided --
14 it was basically stated that if you use the horse 
15 trail, that you do so at your own risk, and that the 
16 association won't be liable for harm that might occur 
17 on those trails. 
18 So, the board obviously thought it was 
19 important; that's why they thought it -- that's why 
20 they put it in. And they made sure it got recorded so 
21 it was part of the CC&R's. 
22 So, after the recording of the CC&R's in 
23 1995, the Levangers still had no involvement, voiced 
24 no concern, and simply refused to participate in the 
25 association. It wasn't until January of '96, at which 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 time the Levangers received a demand notice from the 
2 association that they were five years in arrears --
3 four years in arrears on the payment of their $37 
4 annual fee for the two lots that they owned, and 
5 demanded payment from the Levangers. 
6 The Levangers continued to refuse to make 
7 payment, and in June of 1996, the association filed a 
8 lien on their property; and, at which time, the 
9 Levangers hired an attorney and brought this action. 
10 Your Honor, with that background in place, 
11 it's our contention that Rule 23.1, which is the rule 
12 that allows a derivative action to be brought, is 
13 designed to protect against exactly what's happened 
14 h e r e . 
15 And part of the safety net that is in that 
16 provision requires that if there's any appearance that 
17 plaintiffs in the action do not fairly and adequately 
18 represent the interests of other members who are 
19 similarly situated, that the action cannot be 
20 maintained. 
21 And it's our opinion -- and I think the 
22 facts support it -- that the Levangers do not fairly 
23 and adequately represent the interests of the other 
24 members in the association. 
25 Now, the need for fair and adequate 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 representation, in my opinion, your Honor, is 
2 absolutely critical in a case like this involving a 
3 non-profit corporation. 
4 There are no monetary damages alleged here, 
5 and we have two disgruntled home owners, basically, 
6 who are asking this court to substitute their judgment 
7 for the judgment of the duly appointed board of 
8 directors and a majority of the members who have voted 
9 to approve the CC&R's. 
10 Additionally, your Honor, derivative actions 
11 are designed to benefit the corporation. There's no 
12 benefit to the corporation in this case. There are 
13 two parties before the court in this action. 
14 And, thirdly, the rights of all the members 
15 are being determined and advocated by these two 
16 members. So, it's a very important part of Rule 23.1. 
17 Clearly, the facts of this case indicate 
18 that this case is nothing more than an attempt by the 
19 Levangers to get even for placing a lien on their 
20 property. 
21 They had ample opportunity during the time 
22 that the CC&R's were being developed, the amended 
23 covenants were being developed, to voice concern, to 
24 put input into those amended covenants, and they chose 
25 not to. They chose not to participate. 
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1 It wasn't until after a demand was made on 
2 them for their association dues that they voiced any 
3 concern. 
4 Your Honor, they are claiming that the 
5 CC&R's -- amended CC&R's, are being enforced 
6 unlawfully, that they're being enforced 
7 indiscriminately. There's no evidence that the 
8 amended CC&R's have even been enforced yet. 
9 The Levangers are mistaken. They mistakenly 
10 believe that the CC&R's were used to place a lien upon 
11 their property. The bylaws that have existed since 
12 the 1980's provide that a lien can be placed upon 
13 property for members -- against members' property if 
14 they don't pay their dues, and that's what the board 
15 did. It simply relied upon the bylaws and placed the 
16 lien upon the property. 
17 Now, after the lien was placed upon the 
18 property, the Levangers immediately hired an attorney. 
19 The board has explained, in Mr. Welling's affidavit, 
20 when they found out it was going to cost them $75 to 
21 place the liens, $75 apiece to place liens upon all 
22 the property, Mr. Welling said, "well, I'll show you 
2 3 how to do one." 
24 He did one. They chose the Levangers, who 
25 refused to pay their dues from the very inception. 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 And at that point in time, with the hiring of the 
2 attorney, the imminent lawsuit, the board did not 
3 place any more liens on anybody else's property. 
4 And not to make a lot to do about that, your 
5 Honor, but the fact of the matter is that the 
6 Levangers have refused pay their dues, and the 
7 association has a right to lien their property. 
8 And, the second is, your Honor, the 
9 Levangers, in order to maintain this derivative 
10 action, have to have some support by the other members 
11 of the association. And they are the only named 
12 plaintiffs in this action. 
13 They have absolutely no support. Even the 
14 affidavit they have submitted from two other members 
15 does not state that they're supportive of this 
16 litigation. They sympathize with the Levangers, but 
17 they're not supportive of this litigation. 
18 Your Honor, I cited in my brief a case I 
19 believe out of Tennessee, the Tennessee Walking1 Horse 
20 case, which I believe is a great example of why it's 
21 important that the non-profit corporation -- that the 
22 court not require that the judgment of two disgruntled 
23 members be imposed upon and substituted for the 
24 judgment of a duly appointed board of directors who 
25 are lay people, your Honor; they're not compensated 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 for what they do. 
2 They do the best job that they can. They 
3 sought legal advise through every step of the way. 
4 And technically we admit, your Honor, that the bylaws 
5 do not provide for vote by mail-in ballot. 
6 But they also don't specifically prohibit 
7 that approach either, your Honor. This was a judgment 
8 call, and we believe the best-judgment rule protects 
9 the members of the board, and that the judgment of the 
10 Levangers or even the judgment of this court should 
11 not substitute the judgment of the duly-elected board, 
12 as well as the judgment of the majority of members who 
13 voted in favor of the amended CC&R's. 
14 And so we believe that this case should be 
15 dismissed, because the Levangers don't fairly and 
16 adequately represent the interests of the other 
17 members; and that the members of the board of trustees 
18 used reasonable judgment in the approach that they 
19 took in getting the amended CC&R's. 
20 And, quite frankly, your Honor, the best 
21 resolution of this case is exactly what's happening 
22 now. Two months ago, a new board was elected. There 
23 are only three members on that board out of nine who 
24 are named defendants in this case. 
25 And in fact Becky Levanger herself is now a 
Argument: Ringwood 
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member of the board. That is how changes should be 
made, by getting involved, by having the voice heard. 
And that's what this case simply is; it's 
just failure to act on their part. And now they're 
coming back after the fact, accusing the board of 
gross mismanagement, when there's absolutely no 
evidence of any gross mismanagement. 
There's no allegations that they're 
self-dealing. There's no allegations of mismanagement 
of funds; simply the approval and recording of the 
amended CC&R's. 
THE COURT: What can you tell me about the 
state of the record with respect to the distribution 
of the Welling letter and draft CC&R's to the members? 
MR. RINGWOOD: The state which the record --
in Joanne Vincent's deposition, who was president of 
the board at the time, she testified that all of 
the -- that the Welling letter and the voting draft, 
and the ballot, were hand-delivered by board members 
to all of the members of the association. 
THE COURT: The Levangers say they didn't get 
one . 
MR. RINGWOOD: They testified in their 
deposition that they received, by hand delivery, the 
letter by Welling, the voting draft, and the -- and 
Argument: Ringwood 
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1 the ballot. That's undisputed, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: If memory serves, I thought I 
3 read somewhere in these papers that they didn ft. 
4 MR. RINGWOOD: No, I can find the testimony 
5 for you. I think we attached it as an exhibit. But 
6 Mr. Sheen will, Ifm sure, certainly admit that that is 
7 not a factor in dispute. They did receive; they just 
8 simply chose not to act on it. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ringwood. Mr. 
10 Sheen? 
11 MR. SHEEN: Thank you, your Honor. It's 
12 defendants1 burden of proof to show that present 
13 plaintiffs are inadequately representing in the 
14 derivative action. I want to read briefly an excerpt 
15 from the case, which I have a copy of for the court 
16 and opposing counsel. 
17 As you are no doubt aware, your Honor, the 
18 majority of derivative actions in common law come from 
19 Delaware, where the majority of these cases are tried. 
20 This is a case out of the Chancery Court of Delaware; 
21 Emerald Partners v. Berlin. It's very short. 
22 A defendant has the burden of proof in a 
23 motion to disqualify a derivative plaintiff 
24 and he must show that a serious conflict 
25 exists, by virtue of one factor or a 
18 
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1 combination of factors, and that the 
2 plaintiff cannot be expected to act in the 
3 interests of the others because doing so 
4 would harm his other interests.., 
5 In effect, the defendant must show a 
6 substantial likelihood that the derivative 
7 action is not being maintained for the 
8 benefit of the shareholders. 
9 Now, what we hear from the defendants is that there are 
10 two sources of antagonism vis-a-vis these plaintiffs 
11 and the defendants. The first source is these 
12 plaintiffs' failure to pay their assessments over the 
13 years. 
14 As Mr. Swedish testified in his deposition, 
15 40 or 50 other members of the association remain today 
16 in the state that the Levangers were in two years ago. 
17 Other members have paid their assessments 
18 under protest. We filed the affidavits of Shelby 
19 Ramsdale who has paid her assessment under protest 
20. similar to the Levangers. 
21 The Levangers are now current in their 
22 payment of the assessment. They paid the lien amount, 
23 and had the lien removed. And they have 
24 hand-delivered to the president of the association now 
25 their current dues. And so they are current, paid 
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under protest. 
In fact they represent the members very 
adequately in terms of assessments, because all 
members assessed, all members are charged a fee, and 
all members certainly would like to have those fees 
adopted legally, assessed legally, and imposed -- any 
penalties imposed legally and nondiscriminatorily. 
We have a case here of the tail wagging the 
dog, your Honor. What we have is the defendant saying 
my clients are vindictive, and vindictiveness is shown 
by how they reacted to the filing of the lien. 
Well, how they reacted to filing of the lien 
was to request, by way of letter, what the amounts 
related to, seeking the assistance of legal counsel, 
and paying the lien. 
That's how they reacted. There was no other 
vindictive or antagonistic behavior on behalf of my 
client. In fact, if you look at the state of the 
record that we have for this motion, Exhibits L and M 
of Defendants1 memoranda are two letters from the 
Levangers 
I ask that the court will review those if 
there's any question in your mind about my clients1 
antagonism. Those are professionally-written letters 
The sentences begin with, "please provide this 
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1 information." The demands are made, but the demands 
2 are not -- you know, there's not overblown language. 
3 It's not like they're out to get anybody here. 
4 And it really is a case of the tail wagging 
5 the dog. They imposed the lien, my clients reacted in 
6 the fashion they reacted in, which is absolutely 
7 reasonable for them to react in that fashion. 
8 Now, they're saying that's evidence of 
9 vindictiveness. The filing of the lawsuit is really 
10 the only evidence they have of vindictiveness. 
11 And, as the state of the record indicates, 
12 my clients attempted for months to obtain relief 
13 otherwise prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
14 It's interesting to note that on the bridle 
15 path liability omission issue, that was specifically 
16 highlighted in a letter from counsel for the 
17 plaintiffs prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
18 This error has been made, and it was not 
19 corrected until a week before the deposition of Ms. 
20 Vincent. So apparently it required not only the 
21 filing of the lawsuit, but noticing up of the 
22 deposition of Ms. Vincent before the correction was 
2 3 made. 
24 And even at that time, the only way we 
25 discovered that the correction had been made to the 
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1 CC&R's was during the deposition of Ms. Vincent, where 
2 she first indicated it. 
3 So, no communication with Levangers or with 
4 anyone else in the association that indeed a mistake 
5 had been made. The mistake was highlighted by 
6 Levangers; the mistake was corrected; but only after 
7 the Levangers were forced to file the lawsuit. 
8 They claim again that's basically a 
9 non-issue. In fact, the affidavit of Mr. Welling is 
10 that the liability issue was one thing that everybody 
11 agreed on; the one thing that should be included in 
12 the CC&R's. 
13 Why did it require the filing of this 
14 lawsuit to get that change made? It's not 
15 vindictiveness of my clients. It's the entrenchment 
16 of the board of trustees of this association who 
17 believe they're above the statute, the charter 
18 documents, and that they can pick and choose which 
19 rules they're going to apply at any given point in 
2 0 time. 
21 The second thing, as indicated in 
22 Mr. Blackborn's affidavit, contrary to antagonism 
23 coming from the plaintiffs, it's the board of trustees 
24 who treat the members with disdain. Mr. Blackborn's 
25 affidavit was: 
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1 I probably won't go back after the way I 
2 was treated at the October, 1997 meeting. 
3 I asked questions that were put off and 
4 never answered and told to quit complaining 
5 again when I asked a simple question. 
6 Second paragraph: 
7 The association was told at one meeting the 
8 board will make all the decisions 
9 regardless of what the members want. 
10 That's Blackborn's affidavit. So, there's no evidence 
11 of vindictiveness here. My clients have attempted to 
12 do everything short of filing the lawsuit. Even after 
13 the filing of the lawsuit, attempts have been made to 
14 try and open up the lines of communication. 
15 Certainly, Ms. Levanger's present position 
16 on the board of trustees suggests that there's some 
17 support for the Levangers within the home owners 
18 association, as I indicated in my brief. But they do 
19 highlight the point that we represent very few if any 
20 members of the association. And I read again from 
21 Emerald Partners, because it's instructive in this 
22 case. Another very short segment: 
23 A stockholder derivative claim may be 
24 maintained although it does not have the 
25 support of a majority of the corporation's 
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1 shareholders or even the support of all the 
2 minority shareholders,.. 
3 The true measure of adequacy of 
4 representation, therefore, is not how many 
5 shareholders the derivative plaintiff 
6 represents, but rather, how well he 
7 advances the interests of the other 
8 similarly situated shareholders. 
9 Well, these clients are committed to pursuing the 
10 action which is the first and foremost evidence of the 
11 adequacy of representation. They have, if I may say 
12 so, employed competent counsel, and counsel is pursuing 
13 the matter vigorously, and they intend to pursue it to 
14 its conclusion, 
15 THE COURT: Who are other similarly situated 
16 members ? 
17 MR. SHEEN: Well, you have -- I take that on 
18 two different levels, your Honor. One, every member 
19 wants to see that the home owners association operates 
20 lawfully, legally. They're entitled to that. 
21 They have a contract with the association. 
22 Both the CC&R's, the bylaws, and articles of 
23 incorporation are contracts among these individuals. 
24 They want to see those contracts are enforced 
25 appropriately and legally and the statutes of the 
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1 state of Utah are enforced. So that on that level, 
2 it's every member. 
3 The members who are particularly upset, 
4 however, are represented for example by Mr. Blackborn 
5 and Ms. Shelby; the affidavits that were filed in 
6 connection with this, with our opposition to the 
7 motion. 
8 They have been willing to come forward and 
9 state their opposition to the current state of 
10 affairs. 
11 Even though Mr. Blackborn indicates when you 
12 do state your opposition, you are then treated as 
13 though you are the enemy. And opposing views are not 
14 accepted in this association. 
15 And Blackborn's affidavit makes that clear. 
16 So our contention is that there are a vast number of 
17 members of the association who --
18 THE COURT: Defined by -- give me a 
19 definition, of the secondary, the subsidiary group of 
20 similarly situated members. What shared 
21 characteristics do they have? 
22 MR. SHEEN: Those members who disagree with 
23 the method by which the association adopted the 
24 CC&R•s. 
25 THE COURT: That's group No. 1. What you're 
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1 telling me is that Group No. 1 is comprised of all of 
2 the members, because all of the members have a stake 
3 in having lawfully adopted articles, CC&R's and 
4 bylaws. 
5 Okay. Now, there's a subsidiary group that 
6 you say exists. That includes Mr. Blackborn and your 
7 other affiants. What I'm looking for is: What are 
8 the characteristics that they share with the 
9 Levangers? Other than not liking the board, which is 
10 what you have told me so far. 
11 MR. SHEEN: When you say, "not liking the 
12 board," your Honor, it's -- you know, I hesitate to 
13 put it in those terms, because it is not a question --
14 it's a question of not allowing open discussion of 
15 these issues. 
16 For example, one of the issues at trial, 
17 your Honor, is going to be, here you have CC&R's that 
18 are adopted over a more than 12-month -- say 14-month 
19 balloting process, in which only the proponents of the 
20 CC&R's have all of the weight and authority and power 
21 and speaking ability because you're not holding a 
22 meeting. You're changing rules midstream. You 
23 remember the CC&R's, there's a cutoff period for 
24 balloting which is arbitrarily extended by the board 
2 5 of trustees . 
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1 You have the written communications which 
2 are prepared by the proponents and then sent out. 
3 They highlight the issues proponents want to make 
4 clear. Then you have solicitation of those votes, 
5 whereas you have no opportunity in a meeting setting 
6 to render opposing views. 
7 And, if you do render opposing views -- and 
8 Mr. Blackborn indicates, and as the Levangers have 
9 found, it's not that you are -- that you then hate the 
10 board of trustees. It's that they hate you because 
11 you're raising issues they just don't want to deal 
12 with, or that are not within the agenda they want to 
13 pursue. 
14 So these parties -- maybe the clearest way 
15 to represent that portion is, you know, throughout 
16 this case now we've had it highlighted over and over 
17 again, that there's simply an insufficient number of 
18 members of the association who are interested enough 
19 to attend meetings. 
20 Well, that's not the take that the Levangers 
21 and Blackborns and the Ramsdales and others have on 
22 this situation. 
23 They found their voices to be ineffective, 
24 or they desired to maintain the status quo. And by 
25 not attending the meeting, they know that no action 
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1 can be taken. Actions cannot be taken. They will not 
2 have a quorum there and they have actively voted by 
3 not attending. And that's the position that we're 
4 taking in the matter. 
5 And if that's the sub-category you're 
6 looking for, I'm frankly trying to come up with a 
7 sub-category other than people who are willing to 
8 voice openly their opinion of the operation of the 
9 association. 
10 THE COURT: Well, then how would your 
11 sub-category deal with the reconvened meeting? They 
12 would show up en masse to the reconvened meeting? I 
13 don't buy it. I mean, is that what you're telling me? 
14 MR. SHEEN: The notion of a reconvened 
15 meeting cannot emasculate the more specific provisions 
16 of the bylaws, statutes and the CC&R's. 
17 THE COURT: It seems to me it's unambiguous. 
18 The bylaws say, if you don't get a quorum at the 
19 annual meeting, and if you notice the reconvened 
20 meeting, if you have one person there, that person 
21 sets the pot. That's absolutely clear as I read that. 
22 MR. SHEEN: Yes, on matters which are not 
23 otherwise specifically dealt with, the bylaws, the 
24 CC&R's are contracts and they're interpreted according 
25 to contract provisions. 
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1 If you have a specific contract provision, 
2 it controls over the general, and there are specific 
3 provisions that describe how CC&R's are adopted. 
4 And it says a majority of the home owners 
5 must approve the amendments to the CC&R's and bylaws, 
6 and in similar fashion with a majority of the members 
7 at a meeting. It says, in fact, those are the only 
8 way you can amend the bylaws. 
9 They attempted, through amending the CC&R's, 
10 to not only amend the CC&R's by a process that was not 
11 allowed, but to amend the bylaws by saying that the 
12 bylaws could then be adopted by the board of trustees 
13 through the CC&R's. 
14 And that's why this group, the sub - category, 
15 is probably best characterized as those people who are 
16 saying, "we can't win because you get to pick and 
17 choose your rules as you go." 
18 Well, the contract interpretation says that 
19 the specific controls over the general, so when you 
20 have a general provision, but then you have a 
21 paragraph that deals with a very specific issue, that 
22 specific issue controls. 
23 And our contention is that the reconvened 
24 meeting -- which, by the way, never occurred until 
25 just prior to the lawsuit being filed -- there's no 
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1 evidence of any reconvened meeting at any time in 
2 history. So the board of trustees had never adopted 
3 that policy. That's the situation. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
5 MR. SHEEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Tell me the defendants1 
7 perspective on this contention that there are specific 
8 provisions in the CC&R's, and I guess the bylaws, 
9 bearing on the question of amendments, and that those 
10 specific provisions trump the reconvened meeting 
11 procedural scheme. 
12 MR. RINGWOOD: I don't agree with that, your 
13 Honor, because in looking at the 1972 CC&R's, it says 
14 that - -
15 THE COURT: Where are you looking? 
16 MR. RINGWOOD: I'm looking on the last page, 
17 the signature page, Page 4. It's Exhibit A to our 
18 memoranda, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Page 4, Exhibit A. 
20 MR. RINGWOOD: Right after -- the first 
21 paragraph, after where it says "lot split," there's a 
22 paragraph which is unlettered there. It says: 
23 These conditions shall run with the land 
24 and shall be binding upon all parties and 
25 all persons claiming under them until March 
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1 10, 1982, at which time said conditions 
2 shall be automatically extended. 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 MR. RINGWOOD: Notice, your Honor, it does 
5 not say that it needs to be a majority at a meeting. 
6 It just simply says, "unless by vote of majority of 
7 the owners in the subdivision," and I don't see that 
8 that's any more specific, your Honor, than the bylaws. 
9 The thing about the bylaws is they are more 
10 specific than covenants, and if you want to take this 
11 as being the specific way, then there'd be no 
12 violation in the amending of the voting procedure, 
13 because it's not restricting how that vote should take 
14 place. 
15 Again, your Honor, it comes back to I 
16 believe this was a business judgment call, made by the 
17 members of the board, with the advice of counsel. 
18 And --
19 THE COURT: What about Mr. Sheen's argument 
20 that lack of attendance at the meeting was an 
21 affirmative manifestation of the non-attending home 
22 owners' desires to maintain the status quo and to 
23 block all action at the meetings? 
24 MR. RINGWOOD: The only evidence in the 
25 record, your Honor, is the testimony of Joanne Vigil 
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1 in her deposition, who stated from Day One they had 
2 absolutely no involvement. 
3 It's a continual problem: They just can't 
4 get the members to come to the meetings. It doesn't 
5 have anything to do with any protest. There's 
6 absolutely no evidence in the record that this was 
7 because of any protest. 
8 It's simply absence, your Honor. And it's a 
9 frustrating thing for the board members. Joanne said 
10 in her deposition, because they couldn't get -- as 
11 hard as they tried, they tried refreshments, they 
12 tried everything to get people involved; and this goes 
13 back twenty years. It's not a recent phenomenon. It 
14 didn't start with the $37 a year annual assessment. 
15 It's taken place from Day One. It's just a 
16 matter of getting people interested enough to come 
17 out. 
18 You know, this sounds a lot like a family 
19 fight, your Honor. And where is this going to stop? 
20 Ever time there's a disagreement in a way of a 
21 procedure being run, we're going to be back in here. 
22 Are you going to have to monitor this family feud into 
23 the future? That's not what Rule 23.1 is all about. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, but isn't it possible to 
25 have one member lead an entirely appropriate crusade 
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1 to right the wrongs of management of a non-profit 
2 corporation? Or isn't that within the realm of 
3 contemplation? 
4 MR. RINGWOOD: It may be in the realm of 
5 contemplation, your Honor, but I don't believe that 
6 Rule 23,1 to a derivative action's necessarily the way 
7 that should be done. 
8 THE COURT: Well, let me come at this from a 
9 different direction. It would be unusual, would it 
10 not, for a majority block of shareholders and members 
11 in a corporation, to initiate derivative -- a 
12 shareholders derivative action? 
13 MR. RINGWOOD: Yes, it would be. 
14 THE COURT: And so almost by definition, 
15 shareholder derivative actions are initiated by a 
16 minority of shareholders. Then the question is: 
17 Well, how is the law to determine whether that 
18 minority is raising a legitimate issue and thereby 
19 gaining standing under the Rule 23.1? 
20 That's - - as near as I can tell, that's what 
21 led them to jurisprudence that you cite in your 
22 papers; seven, eight factors that gives them guidance. 
23 As I did my own personal ranking of those 
24 factors, it struck me that vindictiveness was the most 
25 elusive or one of the more elusive of those, because 
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1 it calls upon a judge to apply the name-calling meter 
2 in kind of determining whether there's enough 
3 name-calling going on here to go into the red zone. 
4 And I've got to tell you, I'm uncomfortable 
5 with making a ruling on standing on a derivative 
6 action where the primary thrust is the vindictiveness 
7 contention. I mean that's kind of where I'm hung up 
8 on that. 
9 MR. BELNAP: Judge, can I have just a moment? 
10 THE COURT: Sure. 
11 (Whereupon, a discussion was had off the 
12 record between counsel; after which, the 
13 following proceedings continued in open 
14 court:) 
15 MR. RINGWOOD: Your Honor, in dealing with 
16 that, these -- one of the contentions that we're 
17 making, the undisputed facts are that the Levangers 
18 had ample opportunity to voice concern about what was 
19 taking place, and they chose not to. 
20 And in fact the covenants were recorded, and 
21 several months went by, and it was discussed in all of 
22 the meetings that the Levangers refused to attend. 
23 It wasn't until a demand was made, and this 
24 is a case in which -- you know, I agree that 
25 plaintiffs' vindictiveness is one of the more elusive 
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1 ones. But this is one case where it's appropriate, 
2 because of the facts and circumstances of this case. 
3 And again, your Honor, we're also 
4 maintaining that there's no support for this lawsuit 
5 amongst the other members of the association. 
6 For years, you couldn't even bring a 
7 derivative action in a non-profit corporation, and 
8 it's for this very reason. 
9 And now the courts have softened that rule 
10 and allowed derivative actions, because there are 
11 circumstances, your Honor, where a board member 
12 himself is dealing with the corporation. And it's an 
13 economic hardship to the corporation. 
14 But again, I believe that the Tennessee 
15 Walking Horse case is right on point with this case, 
16 and simply asking this court through a derivative 
17 action to substitute its judgment for the reasonable 
18 judgment of the board members. 
19 There's no evidence before the court that 
20 they did anything inappropriate in the way that CC&R's 
21 were voted upon. There's nothing pointed to that it 
22 prohibited the manner in which they chose to do it. 
23 They chose to do it that way out of caution because 
24 they wanted everybody to have an opportunity. 
25 I believe that, pursuant to the bylaws, they 
EeJbuttal : Ringwood 
35 
1118 
1 could have held a reconvened meeting and passed those 
2 CC&R's. 
3 THE COURT: All right. 
4 MR. RINGWOOD: And that Rule 23.1, as we 
5 cited it, derivative actions are not favored in the 
6 law. They should be used as a last resort, and this 
7 is the primary reason why. 
8 It's because we're standing here with a lot 
9 to do about nothing, and the manner in which this case 
10 should be fixed and handled, if there's a problem, is 
11 exactly the way it's being done now; with a new board, 
12 of which Becky Levanger is a member. 
13 And if there are some problems with the 
14 amended CC&R's, then it's their prerogative to amend 
15 them again. 
16 And that's the proper way to resolve these 
17 types of disputes, not here before your Honor in a 
18 case in which virtually a corporation has sued itself 
19 with absolutely no benefit to be derived from it. 
2 0 THE COURT: Thank you. I have a few 
21 questions for Mr. Sheen. 
22 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, also, if you were 
23 still interested, Judge, in those deposition 
24 citations, it doesn't appear it's in dispute, but we 
25 have them. 
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1 THE COURT: That's with respect to the 
2 acquisition of the Welling letter and --
3 MR. BELNAP: And other materials. 
4 MR. SHEEN: Right. I also have a copy of 
5 this Emerald Partners case I quoted from, if you would 
6 like to have it. 
7 THE COURT: If you could pass that up, let's 
8 take a look at it. 
9 MR. SHEEN: I'm sorry, your Honor; just one 
10 second. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. SHEEN: My client makes an important 
13 point, your Honor. There's still a contention about 
14 who received notice of the proposed changes to the 
15 CC&R's. And it relates to --
16 THE COURT: It's hard to put that on the 
17 record at this point. 
18 MR. SHEEN: Well, it relates to the fact that 
19 the association does not maintain a list of members 
20 per se, but only ad hoc, as needed. 
21 And it flows back to the notion that, in the 
22 beginning, it was anticipated that every member would 
23 have a membership certificate, which the argument has 
24 been made that that provision has been taken out. 
25 But the importance of that is there are many 
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1 non-resident members of the association. 
2 THE COURT: How does the association know who 
3 to send notice of the meetings to? 
4 MR. SHEEN: I believe on an ad hoc basis; 
5 they take it as best they can from the real property. 
6 THE COURT: But that issue has never been 
7 raised in the papers. There's nothing in the record 
8 that suggests that's a problem. So --
9 MR. SHEEN: Well, in connection with their 
10 motion for summary judgment, you're right, but in 
11 connection with the trial on the merits, that's 
12 absolutely an issue. I mean it's at issue in the 
13 complaint. We made it clear, that lack of a --
14 THE COURT: Well, part of this motion goes to 
15 the merits. As I -- this motion is a two-part motion, 
16 as I understand it. One is challenge to the standing 
17 of the plaintiffs to bring a derivative action. The 
18 second part is as to the merits of the case itself. 
19 MR. SHEEN: Well, but they haven't asked that 
20 the entire case be dismissed on the merits. They have 
21 raised several of the -- what they consider to be 
22 substantive claims, but they've said nothing about the 
23 member lists. All I'm doing is responding to their 
24 motion for summary judgment. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I understand, but it seems 
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1 to me the member list issue may have some bearing on 
2 the merits of one of these claims, and -- well, I 
3 guess if it does, it does. If it doesn't, it doesn't. 
4 Let me turn to the question that's on my mind. 
5 MR. SHEEN: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: Which is: You have indicated to 
7 me that the event of a meeting is kind of the sine qua 
8 non of proper action to be taken for and on behalf of 
9 the home owners association. 
10 And if I'm correct, and that's what you have 
11 been trying to communicate to me, I would like to have 
12 you tell me why, in your mind, the meeting is so 
13 important that I should strictly apply the meeting 
14 requirements of the bylaws. 
15 MR. SHEEN: Well, because there are several 
16 concepts here, your Honor. One is the concept of 
17 voting and the requirement of voting, and another goes 
18 to the manner of voting. And the bylaws, Section 
19 2.5., the only manner of voting allowed under this 
20 contract with the home owners is all votes may be cast 
21 by members, either in person or by proxy. There's no 
22 indication in any of the --
23 THE COURT: Okay, but that begs the question. 
24 Please understand my question. My question is, okay, 
.25 I'll spot you that that's what that says. I think 
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1 it's unambiguous. That's what it says. 
2 But, why is the meeting so important that I 
3 should strictly construe that section as opposed to 
4 permitting substantial compliance with it through an 
5 alternate decision-making process; to-wit, voting 
6 outside the context of the meeting? 
7 MR. SHEEN: I'll tell you what the record 
8 indicates so far, your Honor. The record indicates at 
9 members' meetings, poorly attended though they be, at 
10 which the members voiced opposition to matters, those 
11 matters were tabled, were not acted on, and the board 
12 of trustees heard and acted on dissenting members' 
13 viewpoints in the meetings. And the deposition 
14 testimony of Mary -- Kathy Mears was, and Roger 
15 Stevens was, that there were multiple attempts over a 
16 period of years to adopt amended CC&R's. And at every 
17 meeting of the members, there was not a consensus on 
18 how best to do that. 
19 And so our contention is that, had a meeting 
20 been held, there would have been that opposition to 
21 the association, and it's that give and take that is 
22 required. 
23 That's the reason the statutes are written 
24 the way they are. That's the reason methods of voting 
25 have been adopted. 
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1 THE COURT: How do you factor in proxies into 
2 this? I mean, all this would I think be -- would have 
3 a lot more persuasiveness to me if the law didn't 
4 provide for proxies. As you probably know, under the 
5 common law, proxies weren't permitted. 
6 And of course since proxies have been 
7 recognized, it's quite possible to have a meeting at 
8 which there are very few attendees; but there's 
9 nevertheless a quorum. But those people who submit 
10 proxies, they're not there to give their views. 
11 MR. SHEEN: No, but they have an agent there. 
12 That's a representative democracy. 
13 THE COURT: But it's delegated. They have 
14 delegated their right to hear competing views to their 
15 agents. So, as a practical matter, they're not there. 
16 They don't get any benefit of the give and take of a 
17 meeting because they have given it away. 
18 They have given it to their agent who holds 
19 the proxy, who attends the meeting, who voices the 
2 0 proxy. 
21 MR. SHEEN: I'm afraid I don't understand 
22 what the court is struggling with here. Because when 
23 you give someone a proxy, you have determined that 
24 that person can represent your interests at the 
25 meeting. That is still a personal, physical presence 
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1 at the meeting, because that person has had to 
2 consciously decide that this person is going to 
3 represent him. 
4 THE COURT: Well here's --
5 MR. SHEEN: Whether he's an assenter or 
6 proponent. 
7 " • THE COURT: It may be a small matter. Let me 
8 try to articulate it more clearly. The case cited in 
9 your papers suggests that meetings are a good idea 
10 because there's discussion at the meetings. 
11 There's an idealistic view that many of us 
12 hold that one can benefit from an exchange of views 
13 that usually happens in a meeting. Those of us who 
14 have attended many meetings over our lifetime, we 
15 disagree with that. (Laughter) 
16 But there's an impression, in the abstract, 
17 that there's something to be gained somehow with the 
18 give and take. 
19 What -- and sometimes that give and take 
20 modifies the hardened view that individuals may have 
21 when they walk in the door at the meeting. 
22 In other words, the power of persuasion 
23 sometimes has an effect on those sought to be 
24 persuaded. 
25 The concept of proxy distorts that salutary 
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benefit of a meeting to the extent that those who 
entrust -- by proxy -- their power to vote to another, 
don't benefit from the persuasive interchange from the 
dialogue, so to speak, that may go on in a meeting. 
They delegate everything to the person who 
holds the proxy, including the possibility that they 
might themselves be persuaded in a manner contrary to 
the way that the person who holds the proxy is voting. 
Is that any clearer? 
MR. SHEEN: Yes, that's clearer. And if I 
could argue with the court for one brief instance, 
then agree with the court. 
THE COURT: Please do so. 
MR. SHEEN: The proxy process is - - let me 
agree with the court. 
THE COURT: Please. It happens so seldom. 
(Laughter) 
MR. SHEEN: The point I was going to make is, 
in most meetings I have attended -- and you've 
attended a few over the years -- where there's a large 
gathering, there tends to be dominant personalities, 
and those dominant personalities tend to control the 
outcome of the meeting one way or the other. 
And in that sense I would hope that proxies 
are given on the basis of the person's involvement and 
Colloquy 
1 they're saying, "I!m not one of those people. If I 
2 attend, the people -- I will not be a dominant 
3 personality; I know a friend who is," or, "this is the 
4 position I would want to take, so I would entrust that 
5 into the hands of my representative." 
6 But let me agree with the court, that 
7 proxies are a distortion of that meeting environment; 
8 but only a slight distortion, in my view, your Honor. 
9 What is much more a distortion of the 
10 meeting concept is the concept of balloting. Ifm 
11 talking about balloting over a long period of time. 
12 And I'm talking about balloting over a 
13 period of time, during which changes in membership may 
14 occur, and balloting still goes on; and during which 
15 the board of trustees, without further notice, now --
16 without further notice other than an after-the-fact, 
17 basically a newsletter that gets delivered; whether it 
18 actually is received by the home owners or not -- that 
19 says, "by the way, the balloting, for which we said 
20 the drop-dead date of X is on, has now been extended, 
21 because we didn't get the result we wanted." 
22 That's the process we're dealing with here, 
23 your Honor. And if I can take it down to the facts of 
24 this case, here's the situation we have. 
25 We have meetings over the past year 
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and-a-half, including the 1997 meeting referred to in 
the affidavit and during the depositions, the various 
meetings discussed, where opposition to various 
matters was raised by the home owners. 
The actions were not taken, matters were 
tabled. You have that throughout the history of the 
home owners association. 
Now juxtapose that conduct with the conduct 
of the board of trustees when they say, "instead of 
doing a reconvene meeting ,! - - which, by the way, 
there1s no evidence that that discussion ever occurred 
during the early days of the adoption of 1994, or the 
•94 process of balloting -- but in any event -- now I 
lost my train of thought. I go off on those side 
angles. Where was I? 
THE COURT: Well, what you were telling me 
was that the record doesn't suggest that they even 
tried to reconvene a meeting and that there were 
inherent defects with the voting process. 
And you pointed out to me that, according to 
you, the problems with the voting process included 
inadequate management over the members who were 
eligible to vote; to-wit, some might have died and 
moved, transferred their interest, become non-members, 
new members show up, different things. 
Colloquy 
45 
11* 
1 That the time for voting was extended, 
2 apparently without any legitimate basis to do so. And 
3 I guess if the voting process was illegitimate in the 
4 first place, the extension would be that it would be 
5 now. And that the proponents of the voting process 
6 are the advocates in changes, and they controlled the 
7 press so to speak. Those seem to be the major points. 
8 MR. SHEEN: The last point I wanted to wrap 
9 this up with was that, in -- there will be a strong 
10 inference from the evidence that we have so far that 
11 actions of the board of trustees were to intentionally 
12 avoid that meeting because they hadn't been able to 
13 accomplish it previously in the context of those 
14 meetings. 
15 Too much open opposition. So there's almost 
16 an element of intent here that we think we're entitled 
17 to put on, and have the court's --
18 THE COURT: Where's the record on that that's 
19 before me now? 
20 MR. SHEEN: Well, you see I think we've 
21 expanded it -- well, I thought the absolute primary 
22 thrust of their memoranda was the inadequate 
23 representation of the claim. And so now if there 
24 needs to be augmentation of the record on that point, 
25 and if the court will allow me, I'm happy to do that, 
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1 as well as the lack of members list. There's evidence 
2 in depositions about each of those points. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'm prepared 
4 to rule. First, with respect to the standing of the 
5 Levangers on the derivative action, my determination 
6 is that based on the reports that I have seen, there 
7 are insufficient facts and insufficient grounds to, as 
8 a matter of law, determine that the Levangers are 
9 inappropriate parties to bring an action. 
10 Turning to the merits of the claim, it's my 
11 determination that, as a matter of law, the actions 
12 taken by the trustees that led to the adoption of the 
13 amended CC&R's were proper. 
14 And I'm going to tell you why. It is true 
15 that there is nothing -- few things -- more 
16 fundamental to corporations, entities in general, than 
17 this process by which those entities amend their 
18 charters or their beginning documents so to speak. 
19 In this case, and I think in all cases, the 
20 primary objective of the decision-making procedures to 
21 effect changes and amendments to the organic documents 
22 was to encourage participation by system members, and 
23 to invite and solicit the votes, so to speak, of those 
24 members with respect to the issues. 
25 The bylaws are unanimous insofar as they set 
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1 out a procedure for amendment. Those procedures 
2 contemplate amendments to be adopted at an annual 
3 meeting, and -- in the absence of a quorum -- at a 
4 reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be 
5 necessary. 
6 That procedure is, in my view, directly at 
7 odds with the fundamental objective of seeking a 
8 maximization of participation in the decision-making 
9 concern in important matters like amending the bylaws, 
10 amending the CC&I^s. 
11 Next: The CC&R's, as they existed in '96, 
12 do not expressly require that changed amendment to be 
13 adopted in the context of a meeting. 
14 The question then is: Did the alternate 
15 voting proceeding comply with the terms of the bylaws 
16 and CC&R f s? 
17 To answer this question, one has to address 
18 this: Does the determination of that question -- in 
19 other words, did it comply? -- is the proper 
20 analytical method one which would yield a result that 
21 one has to strictly comply with those provisions? 
22 Or is substantial compliance enough to 
23 comply with those provisions? 
24 And resolving that, I look to the way that 
25 the law looks at whether the provisions of a statute 
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1 should be strictly complied with, or whether the 
2 provision of a statute may be substantially complied 
3 with and thereby meet the requirements of the statute. 
4 Because it seemed to me that substantive --
5 the substantial versus strict compliance analysis 
6 situation with respect to statutes fits, at least 
7 roughly, this kind of contract setting. 
8 That analysis requires investigation of 
9 whether the substitute performance -- in this case 
10 voting -- was prejudicial to the people whose 
11 interests were supposed to be protected by the 
12 unambiguous bylaws. 
13 And it's my conclusion that, as a matter of 
14 law, those protections were present and no prejudice 
15 occurred. I base that on the following factors. 
16 First, insofar as the record is concerned, 
17 that I have before me, the Welling letter and the 
18 draft CC&R's went to everybody who should have got 
19 them. That's what the reports that I have tell me. 
20 Well, is there any collateral support for 
21 this? I believe there is. The majority of yes votes 
22 came in. Somebody must have known about it. They got 
2 3 the votes. 
24 There has been no genuine issue of fact 
25 presented which I can find that legitimately 
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1 challenges the alternate process. 
2 In other words, did the voting process have 
3 integrity? It's my conclusion that the record 
4 supports the conclusion that it did have integrity; in 
5 other words, nobody suggested that votes weren't 
6 counted. Nobody suggested that a majority didn't 
7 actually vote for it. 
8 The sanctity of meetings is not the be-all 
9 and end-all of a legitimate decision-making process 
10 concerning corporate governance or amendments to 
11 organic corporate documents. 
12 Under Utah's corporation law for example, 
13 there is express authorization to make decisions 
14 outside the context of a meeting; albeit there is a 
15 requirement that notice be provided. 
16 And I would suggest that here, that there is 
17 certainly, impliedly, notice that there was going to 
18 be a decision, an important decision made outside the 
19 context of the meeting. 
20 Furthermore, whereas here meetings could be 
21 conducted by attendance through proxy, the argument 
22 that meetings are necessary to encourage the vigorous 
23 exchange of views is severely undercut. 
24 If I were to point out, however, the most 
25 salient reason that, in my view, the voting process 
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1 was an appropriate substitute, it's this: That based 
2 on the state of the record, the reconvened meeting 
3 process was detrimental to the fundamental objective 
4 of encouraging and maximizing participation in the 
5 decision-making. 
6 The voting process as adopted by the 
7 trustees was clearly directed towards that laudable 
8 objective. I want to just remark briefly on the 
9 contention that failing to participate in meetings was 
10 an affirmative act designed to affirmatively block 
11 actions of the trustees. 
12 It's my belief that that contention is a 
13 weak one, because of the availability of proxies. 
14 First, individuals who are members of an organization 
15 should -- I guess as a moral issue -- exercise their 
16 support or opposition to issues by showing up 
17 affirmatively doing something about it. 
18 That judgmental, general judgmental point of 
19 view is, I believe, brought down to a -- brought to 
20 practical fruition through the proxy process. If you 
21 don't want to go to a meeting, if you're intimidated 
22 by who's going to be there, if you're gone and can't 
23 be there because you're going to be in the Bahamas, 
24 you find somebody you trust and you give them the 
25 proxy, and you have that person show up and vote for 
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1 or in opposition to the issue based on the proxy. 
2 So, all of that is a long way of saying 
3 this: That it's my conclusion that, to the extent 
4 that the plaintiffs' case bears on the propriety of 
5 the amendment process, I'm finding, as a matter of 
6 law, that it does. 
7 And to reiterate: I'm at this time denying 
8 the motion, for lack of a better term, to disqualify 
9 the Levangers as derivative action claimants, or 
10 plaintiffs, which in my view leaves us with the 
11 remaining claims of the plaintiffs. 
12 I guess that would be the gross 
13 mismanagement business; although I'm — even that is a 
14 little bit unclear to me, because if I've determined 
15 the CC&R amendments are appropriate, that may have 
16 implications for the gross mismanagement issues, and 
17 you have to sort those out; since at some point we're 
18 going to have to decide what's going to be tried and 
19 what's not going to be tried. 
20 So, I'm going to stop talking and let you 
21 weigh in to that somewhat. 
22 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, I don't believe 
23 there's anything left to try, in view of the court's 
2 4 ruling. 
25 THE COURT: Well, you know, I would expect 
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1 you to say that. But maybe the best thing to do is to 
2 let the dust settle. Mr. Sheen, you seem anxious to 
3 say something. 
4 MR. SHEEN: I think I want to let the dust 
5 settle. I think Ifm leaning toward requesting that 
6 this be certified so that we get --
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 MR. SHEEN: -- so we can take that up. It 
9 does emasculate the case. I don't think it gets rid 
10 of it altogether. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Sheen actually raises a 
12 pretty legitimate point. We spend a couple of days 
13 trying this -- some little piece or some big piece 
14 that I decide is what's left -- and all of that's 
15 contingent on me being right on what I just did. We 
16 may end up being back doing the whole business again. 
17 You know, I think there's some merit to what Mr. Sheen 
18 says. 
19 Practically, where does that take us? Your 
20 client may want to weigh in. 
21 MR. SHEEN: Is he standing up there behind 
2 2 me? 
23 THE COURT: Besides strangling me, of course. 
24 MR. LEVANGER: I would just --
25 MR. SHEEN: No, no. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I understand. Let me just 
2 say this for your benefit. I make no claim to 
3 infallibility. That's why there are appellate courts. 
4 I've done what I did; somebody's going to be happy, 
5 somebody's going to be unhappy. That's why I get paid 
6 the big bucks by the taxpayers. 
7 Fortunately, you have competent counsel 
8 who's indicated he's probably going to let the 
9 appellate court take a look at what I did and we all 
10 may be back in this courtroom with me being very 
11 chastened and humiliated by a court of appeals that 
12 says I made a mistake. But I can live with that, I 
13 guess. 
14 Let's take practically what we're going to 
15 do here. Do you want to keep the trial date on in 
16 this at the present time? It would give you some time 
17 to think about whether you want to take it up and file 
18 your papers. If you file your papers, you strike the 
19 trial date and see what happens. 
20 MR. SHEEN: That's certainly agreeable to me. 
21 I would make that decision within the next day or two; 
22 say Tuesday. 
23 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, maybe you don't want 
24 to get into this because we're into the dust-settling 
25 stage here, which I understand. But if you look at 
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1 the complaint and the prayer for relief, Subparagraphs 
2 A through D, which are all the prayers that are made, 
3 A asks injunctive relief with respect to the CC&R's. 
4 You have dealt with that. 
5 B asks for attorneys fees because of the 
6 derivative action, and that's dealt with by the ruling 
7 on A. 
8 C asks for removal of the defendants as 
9 officers and trustees and for the election of new 
10 trustees because of the alleged conduct in A. And 
11 that's been dealt with. 
12 And D says, "as to all causes of action for 
13 rescission of all prior ultra vires and unauthorized 
14 acts, or in issuance of membership certificates and 
15 for damages for rectifying prior unauthorized acts." 
16 We'll stipulate right now, your Honor, that 
17 these people have been offered a membership 
18 certificate and we'll stipulate that an order can 
19 enter. We'll give them one. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Here's what I see as maybe 
21 the driving issue. If this is going up, I don't want 
22 it coming back on the grounds that all of the issues 
23 weren't resolved in summary judgment. 
24 MR. SHEEN: That's certainly the first issue 
25 I would raise, your Honor, because I read different 
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1 parts of the complaint and would indicate that there 
2 are outstanding issues. 
3 THE COURT: And we're going to have to 
4 wrestle with this because it's going to be a critical 
5 question on appeal. 
6 And if it goes up on appeal from a motion 
7 for a partial summary judgment, we're going to have to 
8 go through all the certification business and address 
9 the prerequisites to certification. 
10 I've got to think you've got to do that 
11 anyway; just to cover yourself. And, Mr. Belnap, I 
12 fully appreciate where you're coming from. 
13 MR. BELNAP: I would just say, your Honor, as 
14 a suggestion, if counsel believes that there are 
15 issues that have not been disposed off by this court's 
16 ruling, we're two weeks away from trial. 
17 I think we ought to show up for trial, and 
18 within what is framed in this complaint, if he claims 
19 there's issues that haven't been disposed of, then we 
20 ought to dispose of them. We're two weeks away from 
21 trial. Then the whole thing's going up. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Just a second. Let me --
23 I'm going to let you have your say on this, but I want 
24 to follow up on this. 
25 If we do that, if we do that, why shouldn't 
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1 we try and take an expansive view of the available 
2 issues left to be tried, rather than a narrow view? 
3 At least if we do that -- and I'm still 
4 going to let you tell me this whole thing's a bad 
5 idea -- there are going to be findings and conclusions 
6 on the whole rest of the business, and that might be 
7 beneficial ultimately, I think. I don't know. 
8 MR. SHEEN: I'm only thinking about 
9 economies, your Honor, and I have admitted that your 
10 decision has rendered difficult the guts of this case. 
11 I do not agree with Mr. Belnap that now the entire 
12 case is gone. 
13 But it doesn't seem to make sense unless 
14 we're going to do as the court suggests, which I guess 
15 I'm open to considering. 
16 In other words, I guess we'll be making a 
17 record on appeal in the event that the appellate court 
18 disagrees with the court's decision on the motion for 
19 summary judgment. 
20 It seems kind of an uneconomical way of 
21 handling the situation when the central issue I 
22 believe will probably need to be decided by an 
23 appellate court. 
24 THE COURT: How are you prejudiced if there 
25 are remaining issues and we don't try it on the 22nd? 
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1 MR. BELNAP: I can't think of any, other than 
2 we're ready, Judge; and, you know, we now -- as Mr. 
3 Ringwood has indicated, there's a newly-elected board 
4 in place. 
5 These people need to get on with their 
6 lives. Judge Brian directed at the time that he 
7 denied injunctive relief, he said, "you folks need to 
8 get on, and you need to, you know, function and get 
9 along." 
10 And so, that would be the only basis. We 
11 realize you cannot sit on the bench and tell people, 
12 "go get along," and they always will do it. That 
13 doesn't happen. But bringing the matter to a 
14 conclusion will assist us in doing that. 
15 THE COURT: Well, but we still come back to 
16 I think kind of a fundamental procedural question, and 
17 that is: Is the appeal going to be an appeal from a 
18 grant of a motion for partial summary judgment, or is 
19 the appeal from a grant of summary judgment that 
20 resolves all of the issues in the case? 
21 I guess it's Mr. Sheen that's probably going 
22 to have to take the first crack at it. I'm trying to 
23 think how we're going to do this. Or you can argue 
24 the issues, I guess. 
25 MR. BELNAP: Judge, is it your feeling that 
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1 what we're talking about here -- when you asked me how 
2 are we prejudiced, and I indicated I couldn't think of 
3 any, other than what I indicated, that it is a cleaner 
4 record to go up on partial summary judgment and get 
5 that resolved? 
6 Which handles what Mr. Sheen calls the guts 
7 of the case anyway, and maybe that's correct. 
8 It's just when you get this close, and then 
9 in our view this ruling disposes of the case, and 
10 there's a difference of opinion on that, I don't know 
11 that we're going to be able to convince each other's 
12 counsel of that. So maybe we ought to go up on the 
13 partial summary judgment. 
14 THE COURT: I certainly would -- I guess I 
15 would be sympathetic to making the rulings appropriate 
16 to getting it up on partial summary judgment, because 
17 it certainly makes sense to do it that way. 
18 MR. SHEEN: Could I draft the form of --
19 basically of order and have it approved as to form in 
20 that vein? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. BELNAP: We would like the opportunity, 
23 if it's acceptable, to draft findings and conclusions 
24 supporting your partial summary judgment. If counsel 
25 wants to do a 54 B certification, we would like to 
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look at that. 
THE COURT: I think that's a good idea, 
because I would like to have the Court of Appeals have 
a clear shot at me; and, you know, if I made a 
mistake, I want them to know -- I want to know exactly 
what: it is. And so I concur with that. Let's go that 
way . 
MR. SHEEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, let's -- before you 
adjourn, let me thank you both. The papers were very 
well prepared. The case was well argued. Good job 
all the way around, and this won't be the end of it. 
MR. SHEEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BELNAP: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to 
a close:) 
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> ORDER 
) Civil No. 970300011 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring on the 9th day of January, 
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1998 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. E. Jay Sheen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Paul M. Belnap and 
H. Burt Ringwood appeared on oehalf of the defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Association (hereinafter referred to as "Highland Estates"). The oral argument having taken place 
9 days prior to the trial of this matter. The Court having considered the defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and considering the evidence presented
 { 
at oral argument, and good cause appearing, having made its ruling from the bench, and desiring to 
set forth the Court's reasoning, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions and orders 
as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. The Court finds that on or about March 14, 1972, Restrictive Covenants of 
( 
Highland Estates were recorded in the Summit County recorder's office amending the earlier 
Conditions and Restrictions. 
2. The Court finds that on or about October 30, 1972, the Articles of ( 
Incorporation of Highland Estates, were filed with the state of Utah, incorporating Highland Estates 
as a non-profit corporation. 
3. The Court finds that subsequent to the filing of its Articles of Incorporation, 
Highland Estates adopted Bylaws. 
i 
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4. The Court finds that the Bylaws are unamibigous insofar as they set out a 
procedure for amendment to Restrictive Covenants. Those procedures contemplate amendments to 
be adopted at an annual meeting, and in the absence of a quorum at the annual meeting at a 
reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be necessary. 
5. The Court finds that the Restrictive Covenants of Highland Estates, as they 
existed in 1996, do not expressly provide that amendment be adopted in the context of a meeting. 
6. The Court finds that on or about August 23, 1994, attorney Scott Welling, on 
behalf of Highland Estates, prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates, stating that a copy 
of the proposed Amendment to Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was attached to 
the letter and a ballot to officially register each members vote of the proposed amendments to the 
Restrictive Covenants. 
7. The Court finds that Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft 
of the Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions and Protective Covenants was delivered to the 
members of Highland Estates. 
8. The Court finds that the Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictive and 
Protective Covenants of Highland Estates was approved by a majority of homeowners through mail-
in ballots. 
3 
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9. The Court finds that the record supports the conclusion that the voting process 
had integrity, that all votes were counted properly, and that a majority of homeowners did actually 
vote in favor of the Amended Restrictive Covenants. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Based upon the record before the Court, there are insufficient facts and 
insufficient grounds to, as a matter of law, determine that the plaintiffs are inappropriate parties to 
bring this action. 
2. As a matter of law, the actions taken by the trustees of Highland Estates that 
led to the adoption of the Amended Restrictive Covenants was proper. 
3. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the mail-in ballot voting procedure 
substantially complied with the Bylaws and Restrictive Covenants in place and that no prejudice to 
the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting. 
i 
Based upon the aforesaid, the Court now makes the following ORDER, JUDGMENT 
ANDDECREE: 
I. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted in part and < 
denied in part as follows: 
A. All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint relating to the 
conduct of the members of the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates in the manner in which the 
i 
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Amendment to Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on and approved are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to all other 
claims in plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby denied. 
DATED this the ^ Q d a y o p & S ( g 9 8 . 
BY THE COURT: ^x^"""''////,, 
T^^4#g% 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehrif g?f X^fhir ^ 1 
District Court Judge | § Cru § o ^ 
% \ °«*y m 
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E. Jay Sheen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that on this 2J^ day of March, 1998,1 did mail, first class mail, 
postage prepaid the above Order to the following: 
E. Jay Sheen 
Robinson & Sheen 
77 West 200 South, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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5 MR. SHEEN: Jay Sheen for thePlaintiffs, 
6 Jean Levanger. 
7 MR. BELNAP: Paul Belnap and Burt Ringwood 
8 for Highland Estates, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Counsel, the Court in preparation 
10 for today's hearing requested that the file be brought 
11 from Coalville to this Court. (Indicating) This is the 
12 third volume of at least three volumes in this case, 
13 and this volume does not contain the pleadings. The 
14 Court is telling you that because I have not read the 
15 pleadings in connection with today's hearing. There 
16 are none to read. And when I arrived at court this 
17 morning and realized that, we made a request for the 
18 file to be delivered to us from Coalville. But we just 
19 simply have a logistics problem and that did not occur. 
20 I propose that you proceed with argument, you take some 
21 time in educating the Court. Then if you want to have 
22 the Court take the matter under advisement and read the 
23 pleadings, I'll do that. And if the Court feels that 
24 it's sufficiently educated and enlightened on the 
25 issues regarding today's hearing, then the Court will 
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1 rule from the bench. We'll play it as we can. 
2 MR. SHEEN: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: Let's proceed. 
4 MR. SHEEN: Your Honor, I provided courtesy 
5 copies to the Court on Monday. 
6 THE COURT: where did you bring them? 
7 MR. SHEEN: They were hand-delivered to your 
8 Third District Court office. 
9 THE COURT: That's the problem. I haven't 
10 been in that court to do business for some time, and 
11 there's always some kind of a problem in the paperwork 
12 catching up with the Judge when we rotate into Summit 
13 County. 
14 MR. SHEEN: All right. 
15 THE COURT: It simply is not going to be 
16 where either party will be prejudiced. Let's proceed 
17 with the hearing, and then we'll decide at the 
18 conclusion of the argument how you want to proceed in 
19 light of the pleadings. 
20 MR. SHEEN: okay, thank you, Your Honor. 
21 Jay Sheen for the the Levangers, Your Honor. 
22 This is our motion. It's a motion to reconsider the 
23 granting of the summary judgment motion which was 
24 entered by Judge Ron Nehring. 
25 Your Honor — 
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10WI 
Page 1 - Page 4 
Page 5 
1 THE COURT: Let me ask right off: Why don't 
2 we ask Judge Nehring to hear that if it's a motion to 
3 reconsider on the ruling that he made? 
4 MR. SHEEN: I'm happy to do that, Your Honor, 
5 whatever the Court would desire. What I understood was 
6 that the Summit County rotation was very strict and 
7 that you weren't allowed to request the judge who had 
8 left the bench on the matter. In other words, cases 
9 didn't follow judges. 
10 THE COURT: To the contrary. Whenever it is 
11 logical that a judge maintain the continuity of the 
12 case after rotating off of the calendar, we do that. 
13 If this were a matter of first impression inspite of 
14 the fact that many other hearings and many other orders 
15 had occurred in this case, the fact that you're asking 
16 me now to second-guess my predecessor puts this Court 
17 in a very awkward situation. 
18 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, we are willing to do 
19 whatever you would direct, obviously, but I don't think 
20 the motion is asking this Court to second-guess the 
21 substance of the ruling. It's really a procedural 
22 issue that they are talking about as I understand the 
23 arguments, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed and see 
25 where it takes us. 
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1 MR. SHEEN: Well, Your Honor, if the motion 
2 is granted, the summary judgment would be reheard, so 
3 there is that factor to consider. But I'm, along with 
4 Mr. Belnap, happy to do whatever the Court requests. 
5 THE COURT: Is it true that at some time 
6 prior to today's date Judge Ron Nehring heard a motion 
7 in this matter, made a ruling and now you are asking 
8 this Court to reconsider the ruling that Judge Nehring 
9 made? 
10 MR. SHEEN: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed. 
12 MR. SHEEN: Thank you. 
13 Your Honor, we find ourselves here — the 
14 Plaintiffs have filed a complaint against the 
15 homeowners association alleging that they had 
16 improperly approved and filed and recorded and had 
17 CC&R's for the association. There were other claims 
18 made in the complaint. It is a multiple claim 
19 complaint. But on that particular issue, Judge Nehring 
20 granted a summary judgment motion. 
21 THE COURT: For whom? 
22 MR. SHEEN: For the Defendant, Highland 
23 Estates Homeowners Association on the basis that, with 
24 the evidence in front of the Court, the homeowners 
25 association had acted properly in its methods in 
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1 conducting the balloting for amending the CC&R's and 
2 their subsequent approval and recording. 
3 Your Honor, at that time we did not have 
4 certain material evidence which has since come to 
5 light, and that's the reason for our motion to 
6 reconsider here today. 
7 We sought the ballots that were created 
8 during the process of voting on the amended CC&R's 
9 through discovery. We were denied those. That was 
10 objected to. Since then Miss Levanger, in connection 
11 with her becoming a Member of the Board of Trustees of 
12 the Association sought extrajudicially and obtained 
13 from the President of the Association copies of the 
14 ballots. The ballots now indicate in their exhibit 
15 that we filed along with this motion and memorandum, 
16 Your Honor, and they are contained — they are also 
17 described in Miss Levanger's affidavit which she has 
18 filed in connection with this matter. 
19 The ballots indicate that the votes were 
20 miscounted pursuant to the specific provisions of the 
21 Bylaws of the Association. Joint tenant owners of 
22 property have the number of votes divided by the number 
23 of joint tenant owners. So for a man and wife, for 
24 example, the husband would have half a vote and the 
25 wife would have half a vote. On 46 of the ballots 
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1 cast, the written ballots cast, there was a single 
2 joint tenant voting, and yet they were all counted as 
3 whole votes in direct violation of Section 2.5 of the 
4 Bylaws of the Association. I 
5 Furthermore, we obtained an affidavit, again, 
6 after the filing of the — I mean, after the entry of 
7 the order granting the motion for summary judgment. We 
8 filed an affidavit from Mr. Michael Ferino [phonetic], 
9 who is the current President of the Association and a 
10 member of the Board of Trustees of the Association, in 
11 which he specifically denies having received notice of j 
12 any voting, of any balloting for the amending of CC&R's 
13 when that was conducted. And that goes directly to the j 
14 heart of the propriety, of the method, by which the ! 
15 Association obtained these votes. | 
16 Judge Nehring - a substantial portion of 
17 Judge Nehring's ruling was based on an affidavit from 
18 Mr. Welling that each homeowner had received personal 
19 hand-delivery of the notice. And the reason for that, 
20 Your Honor - I need to step back to educate the Court 
21 just a little. As you read the pleadings, you'll 
22 understand this. But let me explain it for purpose of 
23 my oral argument. There is no method under Utah law by 
24 which written ballots are allowed. In fact, Utah law 
25 requires that either a meeting be held or that 
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1 unanimous consent be obtained for corporate action. In 
2 this case the Association, on its own, determined that 
3 it would seek written ballots, the excuse being that 
4 they could not get enough homeowner interest to approve 
5 amending CC&R's, and so they did it by way of written 
6 ballots. The written ballot had a deadline for voting 
7 in it, in the notice accompanying the ballot. That 
8 deadline was passed, and there was insufficient votes 
9 cast before the deadline. And so the date was then 
10 arbitrarily extended until the Board of Trustees felt 
11 that there were sufficient votes. 
12 Given that ad hoc process the Association had 
13 basically created on the fly, Judge Nehring indicated 
14 that with Mr. Welling's affidavit, that every homeowner 
15 had received notice, and with the ballot indication 
16 that - the indication from the Homeowners Association, 
17 the ballots had been accumulated and counted and 
18 exceeded the majority necessary, that that was an 
19 allowable corporate action by the association. 
20 Well, now we have evidence of two very 
21 important things: Michael Ferino's Affidavit indicates 
22 that he did not receive notice directly calling into 
23 contention the Affidavit of Mr. Welling. Now, at the 
24 time of the previous hearing, Your Honor, we didn't 
25 have any information about Mr. Ferino's knowledge. 
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1 Mr. Ferino became President of the Association and a 
2 Member of the Board and then became interested in its 
3 affairs and educated himself as to the extent of the 
4 present action before the Court. And it was only after 
5 he had educated himself as to various issues that he 
6 met with the Levangers and indicated that the — that 
7 he had never received this notice. Once that came to 
8 light, he graciously agreed to file an affidavit on 
9 that on that score. 
10 So we have filed additional affidavits which 
11 were not - which represent testimony that was not 
12 available at the time of the motion for summary 
13 judgment. We have filed the Affidavit of Miss Levanger 
14 in which she indicates the ballots that are attached 
15 have been reviewed and the indication from the records 
16 of the Association are that the 46 homeowners 
17 improperly voted. 
18 There's an additional issue, Your Honor, 
19 which represents a number of shares, as well, votes of 
20 persons who were not members of the Association at the 
21 time notice was given, but became members through 
22 purchase of property thereafter and were still allowed 
23 to vote on the proposition. And their votes were cast, 
24 and you'll find all that in the memorandum. That 
25 represents a significant number of shares, as well. On 
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1 either one or both of those bases, that is the faulty 
2 counting of the joint tenant votes and the failure to I 
3 keep a record of the shareholders entitled to notice j 
4 and to vote in the process, the balloting process was | 
5 fatally flawed as was the notice process. I 
6 Now, the Association elected to create these | 
7 ad hoc rules. It's absolutely critical that they be j 
8 required to follow them to the letter. Judge Nehring's 
9 analysis went something like this, Your Honor: He said 
10 if everyone received notice and everyone had an 
11 opportunity to consider the issue and the - and the 
12 votes then cast were in a sense proxy votes, we can 
13 consider them perhaps in some argument to be proxy 
14 voted rather than this balloting process, then he says, 
15 the integrity of the process remeans. Well, we have 
16 evidence now that the process did not have integrity 
17 from the very beginning. Now, they chose to follow 
18 these ad hoc rules. They have to comply strictly with 
19 the notice requirement, that is every member must 
20 receive notice. We have evidence that they did not. 
21 Frankly, Your Honor, when we argued this 
22 motion before Judge Nehring, I indicated to the Court 
23 and we actually indicated in written papers that 
24 Mr. Welling's Affidavit fails on its face. There is no 
25 evidence in Mr. Welling's Affidavit as to how he would 
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1 have personal knowledge that every single homeowner 
2 received hand-delivery of these documents that he 
3 claims. Mr. Welling was the attorney for the 
4 Association. He gives no indication in his affidavit 
5 that he went door to door or that he even knows who 
6 didn't go door to door for the hand-delivery. So his 
7 affidavit failed on its face. It failed at the last 
8 hearing, but certainly now in the face of Mr. Ferino's 
9 affidavit. You have to understand, Your Honor, we are 
10 not talking about people who are now outside of the 
11 process, disgruntled members as the Defendants would 
12 have us believe and argued strenuously with Judge 
13 Nehring. These people are the President of the 
14 Association, a Member of the Board of Trustees. 
15 Miss Levanger is also the Secretary of the Association. 
16 So these people have been elected by their peers, other 
17 members in the Association, other homeowners to look 
18 out for their interests. And they now understand the 
19 legitimacy of the complaint that the Levangers have 
20 made. 
21 We were denied the information through the 
22 discovery process. We continue to be denied 
23 information today, Your Honor. There's a continual 
24 pattern in the association to not educate the 
25 homeowners when reasonable requests are made for 
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1 information. And there is a continuing pattern of the 
2 Association acting in an ad hoc manner. 
! 3 Your Honor, recently the Association — to 
I 4 give you two examples: Recently the association had 
! 5 determined and wrote a letter to the homeowners, that 
j 6 is the Board of Trustees, indicating that they would 
| 7 not operate under the newly amended Bylaws until the 
8 controversy was settled. Well, in the interim from the 
9 date of that announcement they have then attempted in a 
10 meeting — certain members of the Board of Trustees 
II indicated to the rest of the Board that they were 
12 operating under the new Bylaws and that they were now 
13 going to remove Mr. Ferino apparently for his 
14 willingness to sign the affidavit and turn over the 
15 information. And it was only after apparent discussion 
16 among Counsel that that action was rescinded and not 
17 taken. But they intended to fully do that. So, again, 
18 they simply operate in an ad hoc fashion. 
19 Let me deal briefly with - reply to their 
20 arguments that they make in their Memorandum in 
21 Opposition, and I'll be done, Your Honor. If you have 
22 any questions, feel free. 
23 They raise two points in their opposing 
24 memorandum: The first point is that we have to 
125 establish that the information was not available to us. 
Page 14 
1 And if we can't establish that, then the motion to 
2 reconsider fails because the evidence was there and 
[ 3 available and we simply didn't get it. Well, that 
4 argument puts them in an interesting bind, Your Honor, 
| 5 because they objected formally to the production of 
! 6 those ballots. Now, they say we could have filed a 
[ 7 motion to compel. They are assuming that that motion 
! 8 to compel would - they would have then have not 
I 9 resisted the motion to compel or it would have been 
110 granted in which case their objection is not 
11 well-founded. Now, they can't have it both ways. They 
12 can't say, "We deny you the information, but had you 
13 sought it we would have given it to you because our 
14 denial was not well-founded. And by the way today 
15 you're too late in seeking this reconsideration because 
16 the evidence was there and available to you." 
17 The second point is the affidavits, Your 
18 Honor. We had no information from Mr. Ferino until he 
19 became involved in the management of the homeowners 
20 association regarding any of these matters. And I 
21 guess their argument is that we should have gone out 
22 and canvassed the entire neighborhood and found out 
23 what everybody knew about every single thing that could 
24 come into play. Well, Mr. Ferino became President 
25 after the fact, after these matters were taken care of 
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1 and educated himself after the fact, and his evidence 
2 is compelling. This is all material ~ very material 
3 evidence. 
4 The second argument they make, Your Honor, is 
5 that the balloting process was not flawed. They 
6 completely ignore in their argument Section 2.5 of the 
7 Bylaws, which is very, very specific and details the 
8 number of votes to grant each joint tenant in a joint 
9 tenancy. And they refer, instead, to the generic state 
10 law regarding ownership and joint tenancy and voting by 
11 owners in a joint tenancy. Well, that's superseded by 
12 the very specific provisions of the Bylaws. 
13 Now, they turn their previous argument on its 
14 head, Your Honor. Previously they argued because there 
15 was nothing — I am sorry. They argued that the 
16 statutes that we outlined previously, that is you can 
17 only conduct business by meeting, a duly called 
18 meeting, notice, with a quorum present or by unanimous 
19 written consent. In their prior arguments before Judge 
20 Nehring, they argued that those provisions should not 
21 control and that the Association should be allowed to 
22 do whatever it wants. Now they are arguing that the 
23 very specific provisions of the Bylaws should not 
24 control and rather the statutes should control in this 
25 instance. Your Honor, they can't have it both ways. 
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1 And I believe I've stated our case, and I 
2 think after you review the information that we have 
3 provided, including unfortunately the rather lengthy 
4 exhibits, our motion will be granted. Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
6 MR. BELNAP: May it please the Court and 
7 Counsel, Your Honor I ask leave of the Court to be able 
8 to split our argument, if it's deemed necessary by the 
9 Court, between procedural issues that I would like to 
10 address and then Mr. Ringwood - if Your Honor wants to 
11 hear on the merits of our objection to this motion to 
12 reconsider — has some case authority to address on 
13 that issue. Knowing what the Court knows at this 
14 juncture of the hearing, let me make two observations, 
15 and then Counsel are all invited to proceed as you deem 
16 appropriate. The purpose, in the Court's opinion, to 
17 have a judge review his or her own ruling is to avoid 
18 inconsistent decisions. And it also has an element of 
19 judicial economy that all of us are interested in 
20 fostering. 
21 There are a number of questions that I have 
22 noted by way of notes as I've listened to Counsel's 
23 argument. I'm asking rhetorically whether or not there 
j24 was a motion made by Plaintiffs' Counsel to continue 
(25 the summary judgment hearing because discovery was not 
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1 complete. 
2 MR. BELNAP: There was not, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: I am also asking rhetorically 
4 whether or not there was a motion to compel on the 
5 discovery that was outstanding? 
6 MR. BELNAP: There was not, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I'm also asking whether or not 
8 any of the evidence that has now been brought to this 
9 Court's attention was available with reasonable 
10 diligence to present to the Court at the time the 
11 summary judgment motion was heard? 
12 MR. BELNAP: It was available, Your Honor, or 
13 could have been asked and brought up and it was not. 
14 And I could lay a very brief groundwork on that, Judge. 
15 THE COURT: Do you understand where the Court 
16 is coming from? 
17 MR. BELNAP: I do. That's why I say this is 
18 a procedural issue in our opinion and doesn't get to 
19 the merits, doesn't need to go there to have this Court 
20 revisiting what Judge Nehring's analysis was. 
21 THE COURT: Well, if, in fact, I have a 
22 degree of comfort in your position at the conclusion of 
23 the argument, that's — that may well be the way the 
24 Court is going to rule. But if there's any question 
25 about that, it appears to the Court that Judge Nehring 
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1 who made the original ruling on summary judgment, 
2 should be the one who reviews the propriety of his 
3 ruling. 
4 MR. BELNAP: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: Not this Court. 
6 MR. BELNAP: All right. I understand. 
7 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
8 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, this case, just by 
9 way of brief background, arises out of a situation 
10 where there's a subdivision here in the Summit County 
11 Area called Highland Estates. And as part of that 
12 subdivision, each person who has a home there is part 
13 of the homeowners association. And the whole 
14 controversy in this case arose out of the fact that the 
15 Plaintiffs in this case did not like a decision that 
16 was made by the homeowners association to make an 
17 assessment to the homeowners to create a fund by which 
18 they could have a rainy day fund so to speak and also a 
19 fund to do certain improvements. And that seems to 
20 have been at the core of the starting of this dispute. 
21 The Levangers have participated over the 
22 years in meetings. When they didn't get their way, 
23 they decided the best way to participate was not to 
24 participate in meetings. Then a change of decision was 
25 made, and Becky Levanger, one of the Plaintiffs in this 
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1 case, decided, "Okay, I am going to get involved." She 
2 ran for office in the homeowners association and was 
3 elected, and thus got herself in a position where she 
4 could be involved in the governance of this group of 
5 laypeople that are trying to run their homes and their 
6 homeowners association. 
7 This case was then filed by the Levangers 
8 claiming under Rule 23 that this was a derivative 
9 action on the behalf of all of the homeowners against 
10 the homeowners association. So they, in essence, were 
11 suing themselves. 
12 - We came before this Court September 30th, 
13 last year, 1997, before Your Honor in Coalville. What 
14 brought us before the Court at that time was a motion 
15 for a restraining order and an injunction. And we had 
16 a hearing before, Your Honor. And at that hearing Your 
17 Honor denied the Plaintiffs' motions for a restraining 
18 order and an injunction which was asking to enjoin the 
19 Association and the governance of the Association and 
20 to have things done the way the Levangers wanted it 
21 done. 
22 Your Honor, at that hearing in denying that 
23 motion said a couple of things: Number one, these 
24 people need to get on with their lives, meaning the 
25 homeowners. They need to get on with life and try to 
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1 run their affairs in a way that's productive. That you 
2 weren't trying to tell them how to do. That you were 
3 simply encouraging that from the bench. 
4 As part of that process, Your Honor set a 
5 trial date in this case for January 19th and 20th of 
6 this year. Before that hearing, in September, written 
7 discovery was propounded, among other things, asking 
8 for these ballots. Now, what brings these ballots into 
9 play, Judge, and what was significant in Judge 
10 Nehring's mind about it, without getting into the 
11 merits, is that Judge Nehring decided what's important 
12 in his mind is what is going to foster the most ability 
13 for people to step forward and express their views. 
14 What had happened in the past is people didn't show up 
15 for meetings. And the governing papers had a provision 
16 if they didn't have enough of a quorum, they could then 
17 do a reconvened meeting, and those that showed up at 
18 the reconvened meeting could then transact business. 
19 Well, at reconvened meetings there was very few people 
20 there, and so you had a situation where there wasn't a 
21 voice, a good cross-section voice of the association. 
22 So a decision was made to amend the documents and allow 
23 for decisions to be made by a balancing process. And 
24 Judge Nehring went through an analysis as part of his 
25 ruling that that balloting process fostered 
Page 17-Page 20 
U h r 
AJLL^ridlVAnVJ, l l / " / - ^ 0 
Page 21 
1 participation and fostered exact ly what the law and the 
2 rules of substantial compl iance should be fostering, 
3 and that is participation. 
4 It is that balloting process that was at 
5 issue, in part, at the t ime of the motion. That was on 
6 the table from day one. Writ ten discovery was served 
7 Apr i l 19, ' 97 , by the Plaintiff asking for, among other 
8 things, each of the ballots. W e objected to that 
9 discovery because it would subject the people who 
10 turned in ballots to harassment . The Levangers — 
11 Your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: if there is going to be any 
13 demonstrat ion in this cour t room, I wil l order anyone 
14 who participates in that removed from the courtroom. 
15 A VOICE: I am sorry. 
16 THE COURT: We are in a formal dignified 
17 proceeding. The Cour t will not tolerate for one momen t 
18 any unbecoming behavior. 
19 MR. SHEEN: Your Honor , I apologize for that 
20 reaction. 
21 THE COURT: The apology is accepted. N o 
22 harm, no foul. Let's proceed. 
23 MR. BELNAP: Thank you. It was felt by the 
24 homeowners association, our client, as authorized by 
25 the representatives, our client, the spokesman that w e 
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1 deal with, that that would potential ly subject those 
2 people who put in confidential ballots to individual 
3 harassment and so it was objected to. A conversation 
4 took place after that between Counsel , and Mr. Sheen 
5 indicated, "Well , I m a y have to file a motion to 
6 compel ." W e said, "Fine, whatever you think you need 
7 to do." N o mot ion was filed. W e came before this 
8 Court in September, nothing was said, nothing was 
9 brought forward. This Court set a trial date. We came 
10 before Judge Nehr ing January 9th on our motion for 
11 s u m m a r y judgment . Nothing was said. N o Rule 56 
12 affidavit was filed, no mot ion to compel , no claim 
13 whatsoever that all of the materials they needed or 
14 wished to have were not before the Court . 
15 The motion was argued on January 9th, and was 
16 granted. Mr . Sheen was to prepare a 54B Certification. 
17 W e were to prepare the order wi th the findings. W e did 
18 so. It was submit ted to Judge Nehr ing and signed. 
19 After that order was entered, Miss Levanger, because of 
20 her posit ion on the Board and Mr . Ferino, who had been 
21 elected through a normal voting process and balloting, 
22 decided that they were going to turn over these private 
23 ballots to Counsel for the Plaintiff. A n d so these 
24 were received after the hearing, which was a hearing, I 
25 might remind the Court , two weeks before we were to go 
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1 to trial. W e were ready for trial. These were 
2 received after the order was tendered, after it was 
3 signed. N o w , we don ' t think they are relevant, and 
4 Mr. Ringwood can speak to that. W e don ' t think it 
5 changes anything. Mr . Ringwood could speak to that. 
6 But, procedurely, there was nothing, and still remains 
7 nothing, w h y that hearing shouldn ' t have gone forward, 
8 was not objected to by Counsel for the Plaintiff on any 
9 basis and that ruling should stand. 
10 What resulted from that hearing — and I have 
11 a transcript that should be part of the Cour t ' s 
12 original file - was a suggestion by Counsel for the 
13 Plaintiff that this matter be certified since, to use 
14 his words , the guts of his case had been ruled upon. 
15 We felt that Judge Nehr ing ' s rul ing had resolved all 
16 issues, but there was a difference of opinion that he 
17 d idn ' t want to t ry and sort out that day. A n d what was 
18 agreed and suggested by Plaintiffs ' Counsel was that he 
19 get a 54B Certification, that we go up on this issue 
20 that had been ruled on, w e let the appellate court 
21 decide if Judge Nehr ing was right, because if he ' s 
22 right, the case is over. If he ' s wrong, then we are 
23 back here on some evident iary issues, perhaps. Or I 
24 should say some legal issues directing h im with respect 
25 to the amendment process , et cetera. I ' l l wrap up in 
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1 one minute , Your Honor . 
2 That being the case, Judge, we believe that 
3 procedural ly this mot ion is not proper. Mr . Ringwood 
4 can indicate to you w h y - if Your Honor wants to deal 
5 wi th it — w h y the vote of a jo in t tenant in a jo in t 
6 tenancy is sufficient to count for the jo in t tenant 
7 owners of the property. A n d tha t ' s the heart of what 
8 they are concerned about. 
9 With respect to the two affidavits that were 
10 tendered after the hearing, after the order was signed, 
11 there are some people saying, "I don ' t remember getting « 
12 this." But that — where are all the other people? 
13 A n d all Judge Nehr ing said is that the process fosters 
14 participation. That's what he said. 
15 THE COURT: Tell the Cour t the status of the 
16 54 Certification.
 ( 
17 MR. BELNAP: The Plaintiff has moved in the 
18 alternative today for 54B Certification in accordance 
19 wi th what they suggested be done at the hearing in 
20 January. So they 've moved to reconsider or in the 
121 alternative for 54B Certification. W e don ' t object to 
122 the 54B Certification. W e anticipated it would be { 
23 made . Judge Nehr ing felt it was a very appropriate 
24 case to do that. W e think that is the direction this 
25 case ought to take as greed upon in the record. 
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1 THE COURT: Anything you'd like to say? 
2 MR. RINGWOOD: I'm happy to address the joint 
3 tendency issue if Your Honor would like? 
4 THE COURT: In the Court's opinion, the 
5 hearing is focused on procedural and not subjective 
6 issues. 
7 Anything further anybody else would like to 
8 say before the Court rules? Do you submit? 
9 MR. SHEEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Regarding the Plaintiff's motion 
11 to reconsider the granting of summary judgment in 
12 behalf of Highland Estates Properties, the Owners 
13 Association, Inc, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
14 The record is undisputed that at the time 
15 summary judgment was argued and granted, there was no 
16 request by Plaintiffs for a continuance in order to 
17 conduct additional discovery; secondly, there was no 
18 motion to compel discovery either prior to or at the 
19 time of the motion for summary judgment; and, three, it 
20 is undisputed that evidence relating to what is now 
21 offered as newly discovered evidence was, in fact, 
22 available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary 
23 judgment was argued and granted. 
24 The Court finds that procedurally the 
25 Plaintiffs had an opportunity to either conduct 
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1 additional discovery, compel discovery that was 
2 outstanding and unresponded to or to seek a continuance 
3 for those purposes. Their failure to do so constitutes 
4 a waiver, and procedurally the Court finds that there 
5 is simply no basis for the setting aside of the summary 
6 judgment granted by Judge Nehring in behalf of the 
7 Defendants. 
8 The Court, unless there is some objection by 
9 either side, will make no finding and no ruling on the 
10 54 Certification question. If Judge Nehring acquiesced 
11 in that process, then perhaps the thing for the parties 
12 to do is to take the matter to the appellate court on 
13 the substantive issues. 
14 The Plaintiff's motion to reconsider is 
15 denied. The Court has set forth the reasons. Counsel 
16 for Defendant will prepare very specific findings 
17 consistent with the ruling of the Court; prepare an 
18 accompanying order that is consistent with the 
19 findings; submit those documents to opposing counsel 
20 for approval as to form; return them to this Court for 
21 signature before 5:00 p.m, October the 21st. 
22 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could we have just a 
23 couple of more days? Mr. Ringwood and I are both going 
24 to be out of town that entire week. 
25 THE COURT: On pleasure or business? 
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1 MR. BELNAP: Like the 23rd? 
2 THE COURT: Are you on pleasure or business? 
3 MR. BELNAP: Business. 
4 THE COURT: October 28th, 5:00 p.m. 
5 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, also with respect to 
6 the 54B Certification, I think that Counsel can 
7 stipulate to that, and we could make that part of -
8 THE COURT: Part of the order? 
9 You so stipulate? 
10 MR. SHEEN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. I'd like 
11 to take care of it rather than going back to Judge 
12 Nehring to get him to sign the order. 
13 THE COURT: In the desire of this Court to 
14 minimize the expense and the inconvenience to the 
15 litigants, it appears that that's the way to go; 
16 include that in your order and then you may proceed 
17 with any appellate remedies you desire on the 
18 substantive issues of that motion. That way none of 
19 the interests of the parties are compromized and you 
20 may proceed on that basis. 
21 MR. SHEEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 MR. BELNAP: Thank you, Judge. 
23 THE COURT: We are in recess. 
24 (Hearing adjourned.) 
25 
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plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, with counsel of record for plaintiff appearing and counsel of 
record for defendant appearing. 
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The matter was argued to the Court and the Court being fully advised by counsel 
concerning the issues involved, the Court made its ruling denying the plaintiffs motion. The 
Court deems it appropriate to set forth the basis of this ruling as follows: 
1. At the time the summary judgment hearing was argued and presented to Judge 
Nehring, the above-entitled matter was scheduled to proceed to trial in less than two weeks 
thereafter. 
2. At the time of the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff did not request leave for 
additional discovery or indicate that the matter was not ripe for decision at that juncture in the 
case. 
3. This Court finds that the documents which plaintiff attempts to now rely upon for 
their Motion to Reconsider, procedurally are not appropriate to be submitted at this juncture of 
the case. If plaintiff felt that the documents were potentially significant or important, plaintiff was 
aware of the potential existence of the same, and of defendant's objection to production of the 
documents for reasons stated in discovery responses. Plaintiff made no motion to compel the 
production of the documents tendered to the court with the Motion to Reconsider and it is 
undisputed that the evidence plaintiff now attempts to tender to the court with the Motion to 
Reconsider was in fact available to be requested, to seek an order compelling the same, or to seek 
leave from the court to have additional time to review the matter before the case was presented to 
Judge Nehring for summary judgment argument just prior to the scheduled trial of the case. 
Therefore, this court finds that procedurally the plaintiff had fair opportunity to conduct and 
complete such discovery as plaintiffs felt necessary and appropriate or to compel production of 
2 
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such documents as plaintiffs felt appropriate. Plaintiffs' failure to do so constitutes a waiver of 
the basis on which plaintiffs now seek reconsideration and procedurally there is no basis to set 
aside the order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring granting the defendant summary judgment. 
Following the ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, counsel 
addressed to the Court the issues surrounding the status of the case and plaintiffs' desire to have 
the ruling of Judge Nehring reviewed by an appellate court. Based upon the arguments of 
counsel, the agreement of counsel and this court's review of this matter, it is determined by this 
Court and this Court so finds that there is not just reason for delay and the order of the Honorable 
Ronald E. Nehring is hereby certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) for entry as a final Order and 
judgment. It is the opinion of this Court, and counsel also have represented to this Court that it 
was the opinion of Judge Nehring that it would be prudent to certify this order pursuant to Rule 
54(b) since the ruling on the summary judgment substantially resolves the determinative issues in 
the above-entitled action and if plaintiff chooses to appeal from the same, it would be a substantial 
savings of judicial resources to have that appeal proceed now rather than proceeding through a 
trial and then a subsequent appeal. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons set forth above, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied. 
2. The Court certifies the Order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring dated May 28. 
1998 as a final Order and Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), this Court determining that there is 
3 
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no just reason for delay and that a judgment should enter pursuant to said order. 
^ vJ ' ^ i > ^ r c f ] 
> j=dX2. day of-Becember, DATED this 
Approved as to Form: 
1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B\ Brian 
Third District Court Judge 
' . .- ,'.S .' ' 
' " A ' . ' , \ ^ ,• 
1_ 
E. Jay Sheen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h i s A ^ day of December, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order and Rule 54(b) Certification was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to: 
E. Jay Sheen 
ROBINSON & SHEEN 
77 West 200 South, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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